



Criticism & Reference: Full Text

[MARKED LIST](#) | [SEARCH HISTORY](#)

Add to Marked List

[Save to My Archive](#) | [Table of Contents](#) | [Durable URL for this text](#) | [Download citation](#) | [Email Full Text](#)



Sinding, Michael.: Assembling spaces: the conceptual structure of allegory.

Style (Northern Illinois Univ., DeKalb) (36:3) [Fall 2002] , p.503-524.

 [View Full Record](#)

 [View Page Image](#)

Assembling spaces: The conceptual structure of allegory

Style; DeKalb; Fall 2002; Michael Sinding

Volume: 36
Issue: 3
Start Page: 503
ISSN: 00394238
Full Text:

Copyright Northern Illinois University, Department of English Fall 2002

1. Allegory, Rhetoric and Theory

Allegory is a Mount Everest for critics. It drives some to renounce theory and descend to particulars, while inspiring others to new heights. Northrop Frye's work on allegory "obstinately adhered to a much larger theoretical structure" (vii), and so became *Anatomy of Criticism*. Allegory was the paradigmatic figure for the semiological theory of rhetoric Paul de Man envisioned for deconstruction. I suggest we can assess aspiring frameworks by how they meet the challenge of allegory, and that cognitive rhetoric fares better than most.

Mark Turner calls *Death is the Mother of Beauty* a "modern rhetoric which makes use of insights from contemporary cognitive science and linguistics" to analyze the whole mind of the audience- "conceptual systems, social practices, commonplace knowledge, discourse genres, and every aspect of a common language, including syntax, semantics, morphology, and phonology" (3-4). Like Frye and de Man, he seeks to extend new discoveries about language, and trace out far-reaching ramifications for the understanding of the mind. Allegory has been a shaping force in the growth of blending theory, too. A typical allegorical scene runs against the expectations of the conceptual theory of metaphor that was Turner's springboard in two related ways: abstract sources structure concrete targets, and many source-domains structure single scenes.¹

Allegories by Martianus Capella, Milton, Gower, Blake, and Spenser reveal to Turner the workings of kinship metaphor, because kinship metaphors breed personifications. But personifications who act like kin as well as like concepts reveal multi-space integration.² Turner's collaboration with George Lakoff, *More Than Cool Reason*, introduces literary metaphor via the conceptual theory, and presents the first close analyses of personifications, notably the Grim Reaper, that become canonical references for theoretical points. The complex metaphorical models and grammatical constructions in *Reading Minds* often suggest protoallegorical scenes.³ In *The Literary*

Mind and elsewhere, Dante's *Bertran de Born* and nonliterary analogies to literary allegories (political cartoons, advertisements, fables and parables) figure prominently as examples. And Turner quotes from C. S. Lewis's *Allegory* book the idea that parable is a property of "mind in general" (*Literary 7*, "Figure" 48).

The theory of basic metaphor has informed valuable criticism.⁴ But some critics see its theoretical idealizations as cutting out the roots of literature. They complain of its neglect of rich imagery, affect, and the issue of belief; and charge that reductionism results. In short, it does not capture the complexities of literary experience.⁵ Turner too saw that while CMT had something to say about other rhetorical figures that are one-way mappings (metonymy, synecdoche), it floundered on more complex ones.⁶ The expansion of the theory to engage with a wider range of forms of language and thought meant moving in the direction of other figures and figure in general, that is, towards a view of rhetoric as a dynamic, structured ability, and a theory of its principles of operation.

He returns to cognitive rhetoric with the network model of conceptual integration, which works the theory of basic metaphor into a systematic view of conceptual connection.⁷ It clarifies non-metaphoric mappings, metaphor combination, and relations between metaphors and categories. It treats rhetorical figures as pairings of form and meaning, like the "constructions" of cognitive grammar. The attention to "online construction of full meaning" removes many literary reservations about CMT, making room for detailed, active, and creative imagery and emotion. Reintroducing the strange complexities of allegory to Turner's model should illuminate both subjects.

2. Themes

Rosemond Tuve remarked in 1966 on "The number of words spent defining and delimiting allegory in this decade" (3), and later years have been equally loquacious.⁸ These definitions usually invoke the formulas "extended metaphor" and "saying one thing and meaning another" (the etymology combines *allos*, "other" and *agoreuein*, "to speak in the assembly"). Indeed it is now common to say that everyone says this, and that more must be said, so the critical history reverts to several themes, within which more specific points become parameters of definitions. We are told that allegory uses numerous metaphors; its basic technique is personification; it sets up continuously parallel levels of meaning; its other meaning resides in a "pre-text"; it is narrative; it is a special use of language; and it may inhere in phrase, passage, work, genre, or mode. Parallelism suggests two additional parameters, based on opposing value judgments: allegory is either simplistic and mechanical, if the parallels seem obvious; or serious and profound, if they seem challenging. Finally, these themes may be linked with specific cultural conditions.

The mapping involved in parallelism, which seems necessary for allegory, could subsume the metaphor and personification parameters. But it has been trenchantly critiqued. As Quilligan memorably says, "Hunting for one-to-one correspondences between insignificant narrative particulars and hidden thematic generalizations, [the reader] is frustrated when he cannot find them and generally bored when he can" (32). The main correspondences are grasped easily, but often intertwine, change, disconnect. And parallelism can accommodate many other devices and forms.⁹

Where semiological models cramp or exclude important insights into recurring questions about allegory, the semantic fine print of cognitive rhetoric makes problems more coherent and tractable and preserves the insights of critics of various stripes. It treats metaphor as a mapping across conceptual domains; personification as a kind of metaphor; and allegory as a kind of blending, a complex conceptual operation akin to metaphor.

3. Prototypes

Definitions do scant justice to complex literary entities, and in fact critics have often insisted on subordinating definitions to the study of examples.¹⁰ Empirical studies of categorization give new warrant to an examples-first strategy. Categories are not defined in "classical" terms of singly necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for membership. Rather, there is a prototype defining central or core members, and other members are seen in terms of their proximity to the prototypical case. In the West bird is understood in relation to a robin-like prototype, and so chickens, penguins and ostriches are relatively "noncentral." Boundaries are often graded and fuzzy rather than rule-determined and clear. Such asymmetries in category structure lead to the "family resemblances" that we detect among allegories as well. This view of categories rejects both essentialist definitions and poststructuralist denials of significant stability in the term's meaning.¹¹

This is an especially invigorating discovery for criticism, where so many categories, like allegory, are

intellectually frustrating because they seem clear when one looks at the clear cases and murky when one looks at the murky ones. We can best model the core cases and treat borderline cases as variations in terms of an account of allegory as blending.

I assume there is broad consensus that core allegories have allegorical protagonists, a full roster of allegorical characters, and scenes of fully allegorical landscapes, "props," talk, and events, with systematic correspondences to a single dominant topic. Whatever we say about what the borderline cases are, where they stand in relation to prototypical allegories and why, there is no doubting the representativeness of Prudentius's *Psychomachia*, Dante's *Divine Comedy*, Langland's *Piers Plowman*, Guillaume de Lorris's and Jean de Meun's *Romance of the Rose*, Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, and Spenser's *Faerie Queene*. These are not the only prototypical allegories, but if they are not allegories, nothing is.

4. CMT, BT and Allegory

CMT sees metaphor as a systematic mapping of language, imagery and inferential structure from one conceptual domain to a second, usually from the concrete and well-understood to the abstract and subjective. "Basic" metaphors map a specific source to a target domain and produce a range of "entailments." They are pervasive in language and are ordinarily used unconsciously and automatically. *Psychomachia*'s prominent metaphor is the basic mapping of the *bellum intestinum* or interior war. This entails that interior forces are soldiers; they are related to other forces as allies or enemies; the forces create two opposing sides; their conflict is battle; the outcome of the conflict is victory for one side and defeat for the other. It underlies a range of possible expressions ("hope and despair warred within me," "I crushed my doubts underfoot," "her vanity weakened her humility," etc.). "Mental spaces" are partial and temporary representations of perceived or imagined situations. BT posits two or more "input" spaces, a "generic" space representing structure shared by the inputs, and a "blend" space "where material from the inputs combines and interacts" (Grady, Oakley, and Coulson).

We find blending operations in the most prototypical allegory, Prudentius's *Psychomachia*. This quite short, simple poem depicts the victory of the Christian Virtues over their opposing Vices in terms of the epic battles of Virgil's *Aeneid*. But Carolyn Van Dyke shows how inadequate is the "parallel levels" model even here. Three major obstacles to parallelizing are "concrete details that cannot be allegorized," such as the gory minutiae of battle; "discourses that need no allegorization" in the speeches that express their abstract ideas directly; and 11 anomalies in the poem's literal fiction" (34), such as the intrusion of biblical figures and fourth-century heretics, and the metamorphosis of the personifications from Amazonian warriors into male soldiers. A blending analysis shows how much better that theory can represent this text, and allegory as such.

The three basic processes of blending are composition, completion, and elaboration. Each of these processes may create emergent structure only available in the blend, as they juxtapose, combine and transform the partial structure inherited from each input space.

Composition is the projection of content from each of the inputs into the blend. We see composition creating emergent structure in the first scene of the *Psychomachia*, when faith is projected from the input of theological psychology and fused with a warrior projected from the battle input. Further, in this predominantly interior drama, we would expect Faith to fight with Doubt or Despair. By placing Worship-of-the-Old-Gods in the opponent role, Prudentius creates a relation between inner and outer worlds unavailable in the inputs of individual psyche, or theology, or ecclesiastical politics (where worship of the Old Gods should oppose worship of the New God, not faith as such).

Other major virtues and vices are projected: Chastity fights Lust, Long-- Suffering fights Wrath, Lowliness and Hope fight Pride, Soberness fights Indulgence, Reason and Good Works fight Greed. Peace, Concord, and Discord or Heresy are also projected into the story. These projections create relations of alliance within each side and oppose sides as mortal enemies.

Recursion is an important aspect of composition: products of prior blending can become inputs to further blends. The Preface of the poem interprets the story of Abraham's army rescuing Lot from captivity:

This picture has been drawn beforehand to be a model for our life to trace out again with true measure, showing that we must watch in the armor of faithful hearts, and that every part of our body which is in captivity and enslaved to foul desire must be set free by gathering our forces at home. (277-79)

The epic invocation makes this interpretive blend the occasion for the ensuing compositional blend: "say, our King, with what fighting force the soul is furnished and enabled to expel the sins from within our breast" (279). The interior war of the main text arises through metaphorical projection from the prefatory war allegory.

Completion is the filling out of patterns in the blend's initial composition from matching patterns in prior knowledge. In allegory, we have recourse to several reservoirs of patterns: sources and targets for both the main metaphor and submetaphors, We can complete frames from theology and psychology, as well as those from war. In the first scene, we complete the battle-to-the-death frame to infer that faith in this psyche cannot peacefully co-exist with worship of other gods and that one or the other must die. More subtly, because Faith enters the fray first, we attribute to her qualities of exceptional courage, daring, and leadership; allegorically, we see faith as having some logical or psychological priority in the struggle. And indeed she is identified as the queen of "the conquering host" (281). Psychological knowledge completes patterns of virtue and vice, so we understand how Humility opposes Pride, Hope aids Humility, and Pride is blind to Deceit. Further, the common feeling that qualities of the virtues jar with war-roles does not come from projection or elaboration as such, but from assumptions about the "characters" of warriors and of virtuous people.

Elaboration is the simulated mental performance of the event in the blend. Prudentius takes his war through its course according to an interplay of knowledge of war, theology, and psychology. The first battle is elaborated with a natural but unnecessary action. Hitherto unmentioned troops rejoice in Faith's victory: "Leaps for joy the conquering host which Faith [. . .] had assembled from a thousand martyrs and emboldened to face the foe" (281). Here theology makes the troops martyrs, champions by faith. Psychology makes Faith's triumph an inspiration to the others-allegorically, one victory promotes the next by strengthening the spirit. Overall, the war develops from individual battles to physically and psychically more complex maneuvers.

Grady, Oakley, and Coulson contrast examples to distinguish metaphoric from non-metaphoric blends. A professor's imagined debate with Kant is a blend without a metaphor. The sentence "With Trent Lott as Senate Majority Leader, and Gingrich at the helm in the House, the list to the Right could destabilize the entire Ship of State" blends several metaphors. "Fusion" and "asymmetric topicality" are the distinguishing marks of metaphoric blends. Fusion means simply that a metaphoric mapping is "prominent" in the blend. Asymmetric topicality means that "One of the inputs is topical and the other provides a means of re-framing the first [...]. For instance, in the Nation-as-ship blend, the nation is the actual topic of interest, the target space" (Grady, Oakley, and Coulson). In the debate-with-Kant blend, each philosopher maps to a distinct counterpart in the blend, so there is no "fusion." The focus is on the comparison of both philosophers, so each of the inputs has "high topicality" (Grady, Oakley, and Coulson). Because several metaphors can enter into a blend,

It is particular connections within an entire conceptual integration network which we regard as metaphoric. [. . .] [In the Lott-Gingrich example] there are several distinct metaphoric connections-e.g. nation/ship, conservative/right-and the blend as a whole does not represent the systematic mapping of one domain onto another.

(Grady, Oakley, and Coulson)

Hence, "it is, in a way, misleading to refer to the Lott-Gingrich example [. . .] as 'a metaphor'" (Grady, Oakley, and Coulson)-but not so misleading to call it a small alle orv.

A number of separate metaphors besides the organizing one are integrated in the Psychomachia. The conventional up > power mapping is present in Faith's "rising higher" to smite her foe's head down (281). The soul is conventionally feminine, so its aspects are personified as women, and conventional metaphors shape their appearance and behavior. Faith should be a strong passion, and strong passions are forces that move quickly and directly. Hence Faith acts without pausing to reflect on her own interests, charging recklessly into battle with disheveled hair and clothes, which signals inattention to appearance. safety, and strategy.

It is important to consider how various metaphoric connections relate in the entire network. Apparent contradictions may arise. Although Faith rises higher than her opponent, Pride's initial height over lowly Humility and Hope corresponds not to real power or value but to something like self-conceit. It is Pride's inflated height and disdain for what is "beneath" her that makes her vulnerable to the pit that Deceit has dug for the other virtues (291-97). Pride is indeed brought low, and Hope reminds us that "the lowly ascend to high places and the proud are reduced to low degree," before flying up to heaven (299-301). Different mappings of the scale image-schema

common to both scenes seem to be at work then, so similar actions can express very different things. But we negotiate the mappings with facility. We grasp that Pride sees itself as high and strives to ascend, though it is inherently low, and that the virtues retain their real height partly by seeing themselves as low. So the (contradictory) meanings of height depend on whether the point of view is internal to the personification or external to it. In the second scene here, the facts of height at first reflect points of view internal to the characters (Pride is high and Humility low). But then apparently the mapping changes, height now reflects actual value from a God's-eye view, and this change shapes the action, as Pride's height according to the first mapping leads to her fall according to the second mapping (and vice-versa for Hope). In this case we might say there is a consistent background mapping of up > value, but foreground actions change as that value is specified as externally or internally viewed. We grasp all this without any explicit marks to tell us which mapping is in effect at any point.

These observations echo the ancient recognition that allegory concatenates numerous sub-metaphors:

The traditional rhetoric set forth by Cicero, Quintilian, and the Renaissance rhetoricians asserts that allegory is a sequence of sub-metaphors which amount in aggregate to one single, continued, "extended" metaphor. [. . .] Traditional theory would describe this analogical symbolism as the gathering of many little metaphors into the scope of one larger unifying figure which is also a metaphor. (Fletcher 70-71)

But Turner develops this point by connecting asymmetric topicality to the function and structure of the blend: information that is likely to get projected into the blend

typically includes specific details that serve as cues for projecting to the topic input space. [...] [The blend] is not a skeletal or static mock-up of a few elements from the inputs but has a life of its own, in the sense that it contains structure that is not calculable from the inputs and that can be developed [...] on its own. The blend [...] can be manipulated efficiently as a unit, providing full access to the input structures without requiring continual recourse to them. (Literary 82-83, my emphasis)

I suspect that this connection between topicality and blended structure is the basis of such unity as allegory displays. The prototypical allegory is just such a scene or action: a metaphoric blend that can be manipulated independently, because it is oriented to a topic space which it reconceptualizes and comments on.

5. Micro to Macro

Turner links up the bases of his cognitive-rhetorical project with its scope of application:

In language, the macrocosm is revealed in the microcosm and conversely, simply because all levels of language embody the same conceptual figures of thought. [...] [Conceptual connections] are equivalently expressed through whole works, indeed expressed through patterns of meaning that transcend whole works. (Reading 240)

That equivalent figurative structures inform all levels of literature adumbrates an explanation for the old curiosity about "how something always latent in human speech becomes, in addition, explicit in the structure of whole poems" (Lewis 44)-and the current curiosity about how textual structure becomes a structure of genres. 12 Allegory may be unique among figures in also naming works and genres. But it is not unique in its magnification of a structure "latent in human speech" into larger-scale elements: patterns like antithesis, digression, etc. can equally inhabit figure, scene, and narrative.

Fletcher sees allegory's strong visual dimension as tending towards a final stasis. Barney, de Man, and Benjamin feel that "reification" is its main feature, the projection of words or concepts as things. (similarly, Van Dyke argues the importance of Platonic Realism that sees concepts as existing essences). I think the heart of the matter is the projection of the metaphor as an imagined scene and that visualization and reification derive from this, because they are such powerful aspects of imagining a scene. The scene is the more precise category because it can include non-visual and non-objective elements-characters' speeches are a clear example-that are central to allegory.

The entailments of the bellum intestinum mapping exist only implicitly in thought and discourse. To turn a sentence into an allegory, we must imagine entailments as participants in a rich scene, with a fictional existence. To do this, we must blend mapping elements and structure with the generic structure of a coherent scene, which we abstract from the space of everyday experience. This must include at least a three-dimensional setting with objects, agents, relations, events and actions." This makes any allegory a blend, because in addition to the

metaphorical mapping, the allegory integrates this generic space of folk physics.

An imagined scene may exist on its own, as in a painting or description. We need not think about its ontological context, just as we suspend the ontological context of the personification sentence. But we can turn it into a "full" narrative allegory, by joining scenes up in a causal sequence that unfolds an overarching action. This development implicitly extends the scene into a whole story "world," because the action may take the characters anywhere. At each stage our implied ontological commitments are expanded but still limited: we draw a line around the whole that we need to imagine.¹⁴

6. Allegory and Elaboration

This expansion from metaphorical sentence to allegorical scene and beyond is of interest to blending theory's concentration on scenes and scene-like constructions. As allegories are, probably the most extensively elaborated metaphorical blends existing, often "running" for hundreds of pages, they give us a unique window on this process.¹⁵

For instance, looking over the *Psychomachia*, we find several techniques of elaboration. Within the battle proper we have action completion and repetition (three duels in a row); projection of specific exemplar from generic personification (Job appears fighting alongside Long-Suffering); interaction of allied personifications (Hope aids Humility, Deceit accidentally fells Pride); simultaneous transformation of allied elements (as Indulgence tempts the virtues to become decadent vices, they physically change); and disguise of a vice as a virtue (Greed pretends to be Thrift). Afterwards, there is an extension of the war space to envision a peacetime crisis; there is reference to real local figures that exemplify a personification (the Spanish heretics Photinus and Arrius, after Heresy is killed). The next move is to a logical (but unnecessary) space, building a temple. Several of these elaborations, especially the last, rely on recursion, in the form of scriptural and literary allusion.

Here we find the topic space is the main contributor to the principles and logic of elaboration: bizarre elaborations make sense as manipulations of the blend to create topic-space inferences. When Luxuria tempts the virtues into a surreal conga line, the point is that temptation and self-indulgence can weaken all the virtues at once. Prudentius evidently needed a way to express the danger of the whole self "slipping" morally but without virtues being extinguished. As things were going, virtue seemed invincible and vice harmless. An anomaly in terms of folk physics is justified in terms of the topic. When Discord undermines the virtues after the final battle, she is clearly making a topic point. It is psychologically true that a struggle can bring out the best in us, but at peace, complacency can set in and discord fester, so we must be vigilant: "What boots it by war to have reduced the ungovernable Passions and brought the good back without loss, while the Vices perished, if a Virtue falls in time of peace?" (327-29). This jars with the war space: dispute in peace-time is no danger to a society and may strengthen overall concord, whereas brutal repression of "heresy" may proliferate discord.

We also find certain patterns in the elaboration as a whole. Prudentius varies techniques, apparently to sustain interest. Establishing one elementary kind of elaborative pattern with a few examples (one-on-one combat), he then expects the reader to foresee the completion of this pattern without spelling it out. He shows awareness of this by moving to new and more complex kinds of elaboration. This increase in complexity also serves more nuanced analysis of the topic. Yet scenes string together fluidly, and however fantastic, are integrated as stages of the overall action of the war, which gets completed and resolved. And every scene (though not every detail) has some significance, constructs some new inference to project back to the topic.

7. Borderline Cases

Prototype theory expects figures to have variants, and allegory ranges from the explicit extended metaphor to the riddle or enigma." The spectrum registers the clarity, detail and articulation of a topic space. This depends on how explicit are the signs of its identity; how extensive is its elaboration; and how much it is occluded by other spaces. You solve a riddle by guessing the topic; and simplistic allegory bluntly reflects the topic space. (Still, naive reflection is more prototypically allegorical than riddles or hybrids. As Kevin Cope writes, "Like it or not, allegory is most allegorical when it makes short, understandable points" [173].) Borderline cases veer away from this fundamental relation between metaphoric blend and topic space. But ambiguous topicality arises from several causes and takes several forms. On the blended space side, a blend may be more or less strongly coherent and manipulable. Possible cases include the following:

1. Organizing metaphorical mapping; fusion is implicit or partial: the blend may leave the topic space unnamed, as in fable, parable, Empsonian double plots (Pastoral ch. 2), and political allegory bordering roman-a-clef, like Gulliver's Travels, Dryden's Absalom and Achitophel, and Animal Farm. Organizing mappings may be limited to a few key structural nodes, perhaps indicated by suggestive names, but not fused-- the action proceeds largely by exemplification, not personification, of abstractions. Hawthorne's "Young Goodman Brown" loses his wife "Faith" in a dark forest; Melville's Billy Budd is taken from his ship the Rights-of-Man to the Bellipotent. Blending involved in planning may be pushed "backstage" and as it were papered over with realist details in the final product. Dostoevsky conceived Sonya and Svidrigailov of Crime and Punishment as Hope and Despair; hence they pull Raskolnikov, whose name means "schism." in opposite directions.

2. No organizing mapping; minor mappings with or without fusion: the author may include fused allegorical scenes in a quasi- or non-allegorical text. The "occasional" allegory we see in many classical and early modern writers fits here (Homer's Strife; Ovid's Hunger; Milton's Sin and Death). Analogous to such episodes but not part of an action are extended figures of speech: the Lott-Gingrich example; the metaphysical conceit. Or a work may move back and forth among spaces, developing implied analogies across them, without fusing their elements. Minor narrative parallels are common enough in "realistic" works, both ancient and modern. A rare possibility is the use of fused allegorical elements as participants in otherwise non-allegorical scenes. One of Pynchon's characters finds her identity as "literally, the Force of Gravity" (639). Mapped scenes (unlike works) tend to be either fused (allegories) or implicit (analogies) overall.

3. Several organizing mappings: the blend may lack coherence due to having many framing spaces, not one main metaphor. Kafka's and Pynchon's extended quasi-allegories have been seen this way. Surrealist fantasy and dreams also blend a range of concerns into a series of scenes but without consciously selecting and mapping inputs. For Empson if a comparison is effective for many reasons, "there is a sort of ambiguity in not knowing which of them to hold most clearly in mind. Clearly this is involved in all [...] richness and heightening of effect" (Ambiguity 5). On the topic space side, a coherent and manipulable blend may project more or less well back to a topic space. Variants include the following:

1. Topic space is underspecified: too subjective, abstract or general to say that the work is definitely allegorical. Organizing mappings may link concrete with abstract or subjective, like conceptual metaphors, or specific with generic, like synecdochic emblems, but without a known system as target (i.e., much literature aims to say something about "life" or "human nature"). Dreams and surrealism also may create blends coherent as scenes but not organized as conscious comments on topics.

2. Many topic spaces: though coherent, the blend is not topically asymmetric. This is one view of the opposition of "symbol" and "archetype" to allegory: allegory is one-to-one, symbol is polyvalent. Also, if the contribution of input spaces is unclear generally, the topic will be unclear. This anonymity may be due to dense backstage integration. Kafka's Trial spaces include at least trials, dreams, sickness, bank work, sexual relations, family relations, psychology, tenant-proprietor roles, modern bureaucratic society, and influences like the Book of Job, Dickens, Flaubert Balzac, Dostoevsky, Goethe, etc.

Let us consider a complex borderline case, resulting from the side of uncertain topicality. Kafka's *The Trial* is only ambiguously allegorical, because while it establishes a prominent metaphoric mapping and fusion with counterparts, it is densely integrated and focussed more on the narrative blended space than on a definite topic and is projectable fairly equally to a range of topic spaces.

George Steiner writes, "Franz Kafka lived in original sin. [...] To be alive, to engender further life, was to sin. To live is to be sentenced for living. This is the metaphysical but also private dynamic of *The Trial*" (xi-xii). The prominent metaphor is LIFE IS A TRIAL. But this mapping is not represented as an obvious ontological fact. (Imagine the concreteness of entailments we would expect of a medieval "trial of the soul" allegory.) Indeed the protagonist K. never fully accepts it. To accept what is soon implied, that "to exist is to be accused," is to accept the accusation. But neither can K. reject the idea, as it comes to function as an assumption, because that would be to reject existence. As his case imposes itself on his mind, another ambiguity of his position appears, due to variants of the metaphor. If existence is a trial, then everyone who exists is on trial. And the Metaphor can map the self to other roles in the "trial" space: the self can be on the bench as well as in the dock.

The first sentences show K. thinking, acting, and feeling like a judge. Quick to condemn, he is indignant about others judging him: "Someone must have been telling lies about Joseph K., for without having done anything

wrong he was arrested one fine morning" (1). He springs up to investigate "what people these are [. . .], and how Frau Grubach can account to me for such behavior" (2). But his roleplaying is anxious, an attempt to psychologically control an unfamiliar situation. Not wishing to consolidate this secret understanding of judging as a struggle for power rather than justice, he backs off: "it occurred to him at once that he should not have said this aloud and that by doing so he had in a way admitted the stranger's right to superintend his actions" (2). Worse yet, at his first hearing he takes the role of accuser to the assembled judges-with disastrous results, as the judges all reject the mapping (48). Later, out of options, unable to discern his charge or the rules of the game, or trust his lawyer and return to work, K. contemplates a kind of *apologia pro vita sua*:

He had often considered whether it would not be better to draw up a written defense and hand it in to the Court. In this defense he would give a short account of his life, and when he came to an event of any importance explain for what reasons he had acted as he did, intimate whether he approved or condemned his way of action in retrospect, and adduce grounds for the condemnation or approval. (113)

In one version of the metaphor, then, the self is accused, and others are judges, prosecutors, witnesses, jury, and executioners; but in other versions the self takes those roles. A dual self accuses itself, conscious of and torn between roles on both sides. The novel charts the gradual but complete role-reversal from condemning judge to condemned criminal-revealing how nightmarishly self-confirming are the entailments for the psychological positioning of self and others. As K. begins to accept that he is personally embroiled, he tries to think of the trial as "nothing more than a business deal": "it was essential that he should banish from his mind once and for all the idea of possible guilt. [... J The right tactics were to avoid letting one's thoughts stray to one's own possible shortcomings, and to cling as firmly as one could to the thought of one's advantage" (127). (His changing perspective on the law is later reflected in the painter's intermixing of Justice with other allegorical figures, first Victory and then with a goddess of the Hunt (146-47).) Hence, at a higher magnification, the metaphor makes all human interaction, with others as with self, a trial:

Witnessing is observing someone

Prosecuting is criticizing

Defending is justifying

A positive judgment (acquittal) is approval

A negative judgment (indictment) is disapproval

Legal guilt is existential guilt

That this otherwise systematic mapping intimates a crime element without specifying it is significant for the novel and for existential and theological views of guilt: contemplating the impossibility of defense (never mind victory) when the charge is unknown leads to exhaustion and despair (128ff.). At the end, an invitation to be his own executioner is insinuated to K. (228), But he cannot accept the paradoxical roles created by the dual mapping, of seat and subject of groundless judgment.

K. moves through a modern urban landscape moralised reflecting these spaces. The mazelike attic offices of the court (and the attached artist's studio) on the upper floors of buildings map onto the mind but are hot, confining, dizzying, and nauseating. The lower level of streets and hidden rooms maps onto the lower body: it is sexual, crude, and violent. The trial metaphor leaves minds unable to act; they are tortured further as their bodies act autonomously and drag them along. A related pattern degrades familiar human qualities (the focus on fetishistic objects, injuries and deformities, animal traits and behaviour), but its meanings are less definite.

K.'s efforts to settle his trial lead him to encounter other people and places, which metonymically link the trial with other domains. The absurdity of these encounters reveals "semantic distance" that suggests but does not demand metaphoric mappings. The trial turns into a sickness, as K. steadily declines mentally and physically upon entering the Court offices. The helpful clerks tell him that "in the end one gets quite used to it. [. . .] [Y]ou'll hardly notice how oppressive" the atmosphere is (68). If being acquitted would be a return to health, then lawyers are doctors and legal help is medicine. But this is a terminal disease that can only be managed, not cured, as it may end in "ostensible acquittal" or "indefinite postponement"- "definite acquittal" is only a legendary possibility (as the painter explains this K. begins to feel ill again [152-62]). At the same time, the trial seems a nightmare. K.

finds himself, other people, and local architecture behaving in unusual or absurd ways. Affectlessness in action disturbs him only afterwards, and alternates with sudden anxieties about being watched and losing control. So to "sleep" is to acquiesce in his accusation. K. accepts the "fundamental principle for an accused man [...] never to let himself be caught napping, [...] and against that very principle he kept offending again and again" (164). Brooding over his trial is "dreaming" that wastes time (129). Vigilance could lead to waking (freedom); but K. falls deeper into the unreality of sleep and dream. The Court is like a totalitarian bureaucracy: as K. finds more and more people connected to it, the whole city, or the world, seems to be a Court ("You see, everything belongs to the court" [150]; "There are Law Court offices in almost every attic" [164]). K. meets a painter who is a court functionary, and art seems a function of the court, another trial: artist and buyers judge each other; models are judged (K. is laughed at [150]) or judge (the artist paints authorities who commission and pay him). And the trial is an art-one must jettison "science" and be "artful" to operate within its conventions. The penultimate chapter connects a religious space to the trial: the accused is the soul, the judge is God, acquittal would be salvation, and indictment damnation. In the parable, the man from the country wants access to the law, but the doorkeeper denies it. It turns out the door was intended for this man alone, so it was subject to his judgment; but since he failed to enter, he has failed a trial (a test), and the doorkeeper has somehow judged him. Parable interpretations ethically judge characters, but they are always uncertain, and eventually suspended. They cannot judge the story, so they can derive no judgment from it. To judge and be judged is both necessary and impossible.

A number of things qualify the impression of allegory. There is the uncertain status of the main metaphor: there is nothing necessarily metaphorical about someone being accused of a crime he didn't commit, even having trumped-up charges brought against him. The mapping is not ontologically patent, as it is in canonical allegories. It may just be a trial, not *The Trial*. Although these domains enter the action, mappings are only implicit. These mappings intertwine, but they untwist into clear points less easily and often than do explicit parallels. One feels that Prudentius challenges ingenuity, but Kafka makes us share K.'s interpretive torment. If *The Trial* is about "existence," no particular theory of existence—no theology or Freudian psychology—is the obvious implied topic. As a result, the blend can project back more equally to many of the other input spaces. A generic "trial" schema can be mapped onto many domains, putting them all into implicit relation, rather than creating a hierarchy of submappings (Humility battles Pride) under a single main mapping (Virtues battle Vices). This polysemy recalls the old idea of "levels of interpretation." But rather than moving "upwards" in a ladderlike way, interpretation becomes a multidirectional traffic between the blend and its various inputs. The relatively full articulation of the main mapping, its domination of the entire work, and the number of other spaces that get connected to it make the whole blend too surreal and complex for it to be called a symbol. Not quite allegorical, it is a blend that, like K., appears to have both many options and none at all.

8. Conclusions

The formulas of "extended metaphor" and "speaking other" cast the net both too wide and too narrowly: many other linguistic procedures (irony, metaphor, symbol, ambiguity, etc.) fit their constraints; and allegory may be embodied in media other than language. Problematic formulas get refined through criticism's traditional linguistic affiliations. Semiology assimilates all meaning to "signification," modeled on the designation of objects using arbitrary sounds. It restates the issues in terms of coded signifying chains, but this cannot explain complex conceptual structures.

Against traditional prescriptive and modern formal linguistics, Turner advocates reconnecting language and literature with human life:

A human being has a human brain in a human body in its physical environment that it must make intelligible if it is to survive. This is the ground, I think, of human cognition, and the source of four] everyday conceptual apparatus [. . .]. The study of language to which I look forward would analyze the nature and processes of this conceptual apparatus, its expression in language, and its exploitation in literature. (Reading 17-18)

All cognition feeds into meaning. This view foregrounds the essentials of allegory in all its modes: images, personifications, scenes, narratives, and conceptual structures. BT inherits rigorous accounts of these elements from symbiotic relations with other areas of rhetoric and cognitive science.

For BT, the "extended metaphor" formula subsumes the accepted wisdom about "other speech" and personifications. Allegory's global secondary reference constitutes an extended metaphor, or other-speech. This metaphor is also "extended" by numerous sub-metaphors, including personifications. But positing bi-level

"correspondence" is doubly intractable: some details defy allegorization and some discourse makes allegorization superfluous. BT's model of a networked but autonomous central blend space guided by a main topic accommodates this and other recalcitrant issues. That the topic can be the target of a dominant metaphor explains the persistent sense that allegory "is" an extended metaphor. That the blend can be linked to many spaces answers the fact that allegories are not just source-target "correspondences," but indeed integrate material from theory, culture, inner and outer experience, and more. The link between topic and many-- space blend accounts for "anomalies in the poem's literal fiction." These express some aspect of the topic that is inexpressible by the basic metaphor. Finally, the emergent-structure principle refutes the cliché that allegory only illustrates mechanically some prior system. The power of this approach to resolve the dilemmas of criticism while preserving its discoveries recommends it to other aspects of rhetoric. Perhaps more old formulas can be cashed out in ways that are finally adequate to literature.

[Footnote]

Notes

[Footnote]

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the American Comparative Literature Association annual conference in 2001 and posted on Mark Turner's Blending and Conceptual Integration Web site.

[Footnote]

1 I designate "conceptual metaphor theory" and "blending theory" (or "the network model of conceptual integration") as CMT and BT hereafter. Turner proposes that blending accounts for the emergence of "modern human imagination" including "art, science, religion, culture, refined tool use, and language" (Blending). Frye aimed at a systematic view of the operation of the human imagination. De Man expands deconstruction to all figures and forms of discourse and insists that it is the beginning of literary theory and ideology critique.

[Footnote]

2 See the analysis of Sin interceding between Satan and Death (Death 86-90).

[Footnote]

3 Consider the discussion of the construals of "XYZ constructions" (Aristotle's "proportional metaphor") like "vanity is the quicksand of reason" (206-7). The metaphorical model underlying classical rhetoric, Rational Argument Is Combat Between Intentional Agents (112), suggests an integrated unconscious scene of Psychomachia (chapter 5, 99-120).

[Footnote]

4 Steen surveys the explosion of research CMT has generated in the social sciences (chapter 1) and in literary criticism (chapter 2). Poetics Today has devoted several special issues to literary explorations of the theory and its developments (13:4 [1992], 14:1 [1993], 20:3 [1999]). I had completed this paper before discovering Peter Crisp's study of CMT and allegory.

5 Jackendoff and Aaron criticize Lakoff and Turner for neglecting imagery, affect, and the question of belief. Miall criticizes Johnson for downplaying affect. Tsur perceives potential reductionism ('EVENT STRUCTURE') and "stock responses" ("Lakoff's Roads") in conceptual redescrptions of literary phenomena. Gross alleges that Turner reduces literature to concepts. All seem concerned with a lack of interplay between literal and metaphoric understandings.

[Footnote]

6 Treating metaphor as unconscious and automatic implied that mappings required no new work. See the contrast of the theory of basic metaphor with his theory of generic-level metaphor (Reading 158-71).

7 See his essay "Figure." The network model, developed with Gilles Fauconnier was presented formally in its entirety in 1998 ("Conceptual Integration"). For further papers and references on the many constructions that fall within its purview, see Turner's Blending and Conceptual Integration Web site.

[Footnote]

8 There arose two traditions of allegory study, those focussed on particular writers, traditions, and cultural contexts of medieval allegory, and those of a more generalist spirit, embracing Enlightenment, Romantic, and modernist allegories as well. The medievalists include C. S. Lewis, *The Allegory of Love*, Erich Auerbach, "Figura," D. W. Robertson, *A Preface to Chaucer*, A. C. Charity, *Events and Their Afterlife*, Rosemond Tuve, *Allegorical Imagery*, John Fleming, *The Roman de la Rose*, and Winthrop Wetherbee, *Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century*. The generalists can be traced from Frye's influential *Anatomy of Criticism* to Edwin Honig's *Dark Conceit*, Angus Fletcher's *Allegory*, Maureen Quilligan's *The Language of Allegory*, and Stephen Barney's *Allegories of History, Allegories of Love*. This is not of course to say that there is no interchange between them, but the generalists extend their group of allegory-defining writers to (most frequently) Spenser, Bunyan, Milton, Swift, Melville, Hawthorne, and Kafka. Paul de Man's *Allegories of Reading* and Walter Benjamin's *Origin of German Tragic Drama* have been very influential for poststructuralist criticism. Studies addressing poststructuralist themes include the collections *Allegories of Representation* (ed. Stephen Greenblatt), *Allegory, Myth, and Symbol* (ed. Morton Bloomfield), *Allegoresis* (ed. Stephen J. Russell), and *Enlightening Allegory* (ed. Kevin L. Cope), Deborah

Madsen's Rereading Allegory, Carolynn Van Dyke's *The Fiction of Truth*, and Theresa Kelley's *Reinventing Allegory*.

[Footnote]

9 Lewis condemns both parts of the *Romance of the Rose* for confusing the parallels. Later critics, especially Whitman and Van Dyke, have questioned the presumption of consistent parallels, seeing "confusion" as typical and potentially enriching. Whitman describes the "pull between the oblique and the direct, or between divergence and correspondence" (8), as divergences undermine initial correspondences in both interpretation and composition. Van Dyke rejects the aim of completely matching levels to concentrate on specific semantic texture (45).

10 See Honig (8-9), Tuve (3). Quilligan, Barney, Whitman, and Van Dyke agree that beginning with the texts is wiser.

11 Rosch's "Principles of Categorization" summarizes pioneering research into "prototype effects" in categorization in the 1970s. Lakoff's *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things* explains prototype effects in terms of a theory of "Idealized Cognitive Models."

12 Honig observes "how an allegorical trope extends itself and, further, how it serves as a guiding motif in a longer work" (11). Quilligan claims allegory

[Footnote]

generates narrative out of wordplay by extending the structure of personification (33-42). Van Dyke (20), Madsen (29) and most recently Kelley agree that allegory "has been (and still is) a rhetorical figure, a carefully patterned narrative or dramatic form or genre (more strictly defined), and a method of interpretation" (12).

[Footnote]

13 Gerald Edelman concentrates on the importance to "primary consciousness" of integrating sets of mappings from different perceptual modalities into coherent scenes and linking them up with "registers of values" hard-wired into the brain (I 17ff.). This ability is basic to planning and executing motor actions. Narrative integrates a series of scenes across a fourth dimension, time. Turner's "small spatial stories" and "narrative imagining" work with an event-shape or "aspect" involving objects, events, and actors (*Literary*, chapters two and three, 12-37). Similarly, the "situations" of mental spaces are scene-like.

14 To get from here to genre, a series of works must imitate the narrative allegory's structure and related features. With a formal technique (allegory) and a typical topic-schema (education) that fit well together, and may match plots of battle, quest, love, etc., a genre is on its way. Alastair Fowler describes allegory as a constructional type—the embodiment of a function in a rhetorical structure. "Constructional types are unlike historical kinds in their elasticity of scale" (297981).

[Footnote]

15 Fletcher emphasizes composition and completion in allegorical elaboration: the "conceptual hero" generates subcharacters by "projecting" aspects of himself, for example (35ff.). Whitman suggests that elaboration tends to disrupt the initial composition, so allegory "is potentially on a collision course with itself" (4, 6; see ch. 1).

16 J. Hillis Miller notes that "the word and the concept of allegory in English is part of a chain of related terms and concepts, including parable, symbol, image, sign, emblem, figure, aphorism, metaphor, and translation" (356). Others link it to ambiguity, allusion, aenigma, and irony. Kelley concentrates on how texts combine allegory with other rhetorical forms—realism, symbolism, irony. Frye also speaks of a "sliding scale" of works, "ranging from the most explicitly allegorical, consistent with being literature at all, at one extreme, to the most elusive, anti-explicit and anti-allegorical at the other" (91).

[Reference]

Works Cited

[Reference]

Auerbach, Erich. "Figura." *Scenes From The Drama Of European Literature: Six Essays*. Trans. Ralph Mannheim. New York: Meridian, 1959. 11-76.

Barney, Stephen A. *Allegories of History, Allegories of Love*. Hamden: ArchonShoe String, 1979.

Benjamin, Walter. *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*. Trans. John Osborne. London: New Left Books, 1977.

[Reference]

Bloomfield, Morton, ed. *Allegory, Myth, and Symbol*. Harvard English Studies 9. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1981.

Charity, A. C. *Events and Their Afterlife: The Dialectics of Christian Typology in the Bible and Dante*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1966.

Cope, Kevin L., ed. "Directions to Signify: Exploring the Emblems of Enlightenment Allegory." *Enlightening Allegory: Theory, Practice, and Contexts of Allegory in the Late Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*. Ed. Kevin L. Cope. AMS Studies in the Eighteenth Century 18. New York: AMS, 1993. 171-218.

[Reference]

-. *Enlightening Allegory: Theory, Practice, and Contexts of Allegory in the Late Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*. AMS Studies in the Eighteenth Century 18. New York: AMS, 1993.

Crisp, Peter. "Allegory: Conceptual Metaphor in History." *Language and Literature* 10.1 (2001): 5-19.

De Man, Paul. *Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1979.

Edelman, Gerald M. *Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind*. New York: Basic-Perseus, 1992.

[Reference]

Empson, William. *Seven Types of Ambiguity*. 31 ed. New York: Meridian, 1955. -. *Some Versions of Pastoral*. London: Chatto, 1950.

Fauconnier, Gilles, and Mark Turner. "Conceptual Integration Networks." *Cognitive Science* 22.2 (April-June 1998): 133-87. Expanded web vets. 10 Feb. 2001. *Blending and Conceptual Integration*. Ed. Mark Turner. March 2001. <<http://www.inform.umd.edu.proxy.lib.uwaterloo.ca/Edges/Colleges/ARHU/Depts/English/englfac/MTurner/cin.web/cin.html>>

Fleming, John V. *The Roman de la Rose: A Study in Allegory and Iconography*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1969.

Fletcher, Angus. *Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1964.

Fludernik, Monika, Donald C. Freeman, and Margaret H. Freeman, eds. *Metaphor and Beyond: New Cognitive Developments*. Spec. issue of *Poetics Today*. 20.3 (1999): 383-541.

Fowler, Alastair. "The Future of Genre Theory: Functions and Constructional. Types." *The Future of Literary Theory*. Ed. Ralph Cohen. New York: Routledge-Routledge, 1989. 291-303.

Frye, Northrop. *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays*. 1957. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1971.

[Reference]

Grady, Joseph, Todd Oakley, and Seana Coulson. "Blending and Metaphor." *Metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics: Selected Papers from the Fifth International Cognitive Linguistics Conference, Amsterdam, July 1997*. Ed. Raymond W. Gibbs Jr., and Gerard J. Steen. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1999.101-24. <<http://www.wam.umd.edu.proxy.lib.uwaterloo.ca/~mturn/WWW/blendaphor.html>>.

Greenblatt, Stephen J., ed. *Allegories of Representation: Selected Papers from the English Institute, 1979-80*. New Series 5. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1981.

Gross, Sabine. "Cognitive Readings; or, The Disappearance of Literature in the Mind." *Rev. of Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science*, by Mark Turner. *Poetics Today* 18.2 (1997): 271-97.

[Reference]

Hillis Miller, J. "The Two Allegories." *Allegory, Myth, and Symbol*. Ed. Morton Bloomfield. *Harvard English Studies* 9. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1981. 35570.

Honig, Edwin. *Dark Conceit: The Making of Allegory*. 1959., New York: Galaxy-- Oxford UP, 1966.

Jackendoff, Ray, and David Aaron. *Rev. of More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor*, by George Lakoff and Mark Turner. *Language* 67.2 (1991): 320-38.

Kafka, Franz. *The Trial: The Definitive Edition*. Trans. Willa and Edwin Muir. *Introd. George Steiner. Rev. and trans. E. M. Butler*. New York: Schocken, 1995.

Kelley, Theresa. *Reinventing Allegory*. *Cambridge Studies in Romanticism* 22. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997.

Lakoff, George. *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987.

Lakoff, George, and Mark Turner. *More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1989.

Lewis, C. S. *The Allegory of Love: A Study in Medieval Tradition*. 1936. London: Oxford UP, 1959.

Madsen, Deborah. *Rereading Allegory: A Narrative Approach to Genre*. New York: St. Martin's, 1994.

Miall, David. "The Body in Literature: Mark Johnson, Metaphor, and Feeling." *Journal of Literary Semantics* 26.3 (1997): 191-210. *Reader Response: Empirical Research on Literary Reading*. Ed. David S. Miall and Don Kuiken. 15 June 1998. U of Alberta. 2 Nov. 2000. <<http://www.ualberta.ca.proxy.lib.uwaterloo.ca/~dmiall/reading/BODYMIND.htm>>

Prudentius. *Psychomachia*. Prudentius. Trans. H. J. Thomson. Vol. 1. *Loeb Classical Library*. London: Heinemann, 1949. 274-343.

[Reference]

Pynchon, Thomas. *Gravity's Rainbow*. New York: Viking, 1973.

Quilligan, Maureen. *The Language of Allegory: Defining the Genre*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1979.

Robertson, D. W., Jr. *A Preface to Chaucer*. *Studies in Medieval Perspectives*. 1962. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1967.

[Reference]

Rosch, Eleanor. "Principles of Categorization." *Cognition and Categorization*. Ed. E. Rosch and Barbara B. Lloyd. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1978. 27-48.

Russell, Stephen J., ed. *Allegoresis: The Craft of Allegory in Medieval Literature*. *Garland Reference Lib. of the Humanities* 664. New York: Garland, 1988.

Shen, Yeshayahu, ed. *Aspects of Metaphor Comprehension*. Spec. issue of *Poetics Today* 13.4 (1992): 567-811.

- ed. *Metaphor 2*. Spec. issue of *Poetics Today* 14.1 (1993): 1-97.

Steen, Gerard. *Understanding Metaphor in Literature: An Empirical Approach*. *Studies in Lang. and Linguistics*. London: Longman, 1994.

Steiner, George. *Introduction. The Trial: The Definitive Edition*. By Franz Kafka. Trans. Willa and Edwin Muir. *Rev. and trans. E. M. Butler*. New York: Schocken, 1995. vii-xxi.

[Reference]

Tsur, Reuven. "'EVENT STRUCTURE' Metaphor and Reductionism. (an exercise in functional criticism)." Home page. Tel Aviv U. 17 Aug. 2001. <http://www.tau.ac.il.proxy.lib.uwaterloo.ca/%7Etsurxx/Emily_Dickinson.html>.

"Lakoff's Roads Not Taken." *Pragmatics and Cognition* 7 (2000): 339-359. Home page. Tel Aviv U. 17 Aug. 2001. <[http://www.tau.ac.il.proxy.lib.uwaterloo.ca/%7Etsurxx/ Stock_Responses.html](http://www.tau.ac.il.proxy.lib.uwaterloo.ca/%7Etsurxx/Stock_Responses.html)>

Turner, Mark, ed. *Blending and Conceptual Integration*. <[http:// www.wam.umd.edu/~mturn/WWW/blending.html](http://www.wam.umd.edu/~mturn/WWW/blending.html)>
Death is the Mother of Beauty: Mind, Metaphor, Criticism. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987.
- "Figure." *Figurative Language and Thought*. Albert N. Katz, Cristina Cacciari, Raymond W. Gibbs Jr., and Mark Turner. *Counterpoints: Cognition, Memory, and Language*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998. 44-87.
- *The Literary Mind: The Origins of Thought and Language*. New York: Oxford UP, 1996.
Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1991.
Tuve, Rosemond. *Allegorical Imagery: Some Medieval Books and Their Posterity*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1966.

[Reference]

Van Dyke,Carolynn. *The Fiction of Truth: Structures of Meaning in Narrative and Dramatic Allegory*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1985.
Wetherbee, Winthrop. *Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century: The Literay Influence of the School of Charters*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1972.
Whitman, Jon. *Allegory: The Dynamics of an Ancient and Medieval Technique*.

[Author note]

Michael Sinding
McMaster University

[Author note]

Michael Sinding (knight.sinding@sympatico.ca) is completing his Ph.D. in English at McMaster University. His dissertation "The Mind's Kinds: Cognition and Literary Genre" connects theories of categorization and conceptualization to theories of literary genres through a focus on the role of Menippean satire in the rise of the novel.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction or distribution is prohibited without permission.

[End session](#)

[Accessibility statement](#).

Send your suggestions, comments or queries to our [Webmaster](#).
[Copyright](#) © 1996-2006 ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights reserved.