Allegory is closely related to but importantly different from extended metaphor. Extended metaphors set up blended spaces. Mental spaces, of which blended spaces are a subset, are radically different kinds of things from possible worlds, having, unlike possible worlds, no definable metaphysical status. Extended metaphors set up blended spaces but allegories refer to and describe possible fictional situations. The distinction between possible situations and blended spaces accounts for important differences of imaginative effect between allegory and extended metaphor. Although allegorical scenes are not blended spaces, they do have their origin in such spaces. The differences revealed between allegory and extended metaphor emphasize the need for cognitive semantics to give a detailed account of the relations between mental spaces and questions of reference and truth.

The dominant sense of the term allegory in literary contexts refers to fictions that are given a continuously metaphorical interpretation (Crisp, 2001). Prototypical allegories in this sense are Bunyan’s (1984) The Pilgrim’s Progress and Spenser’s (1978) The Faerie Queene. The Pilgrim’s Progress, for example, tells the story of a man’s journey through a frequently difficult and dangerous country that is interpreted metaphorically as the story of the Christian life in the abstract. In such works, there is no overt reference to the metaphorical target. Instead, the work’s language relates directly to the metaphorical source alone constructed as a fictional situation. This fictional situation itself then receives a further metaphorical projection (Crisp, 2001). When the opening of The Pilgrim’s Progress refers to “a Man clothed in rags,” this character has the status of a fictional character in a fictional
situation (Bunyan, 1984, p. 8). We later learn that he is named Christian and to further project him pragmatically in terms of the Calvinist elect, yet he never ceases to exist first as a fictional character in a fictional situation. This is equally true of the knightly heroes in *The Faerie Queene*, and also of characters such as Idleness or Gluttony seen by the Red Crosse Knight in the House of Pride (Spenser, 1978, pp. 83–84). In the case of such abstract personifications, an abstract noun refers via a metaphoric pragmatic connector to a character in a fictional situation. This character is then projected back onto the relevant abstract property (Crisp, 2001, in press). Direct references are all to the metaphorical source.

Allegory is a varied phenomenon. Not all allegories, for example, contain abstract personifications. Dante’s *La Divina Comedia* [*The Divine Comedy*], probably the most famous allegory of all, is inhabited mainly by historical characters. Yet there is still, in addition to the fictional situations in which these characters appear, a continuous level of further metaphorical interpretation. In the *Letter to Can Grande*, Dante states that *La Divina Commedia* is to be read like the Bible according to the famous four levels of meaning: literal, allegorical, homiletic, and anagogical (Quilligan, 1979, pp. 101–103). (The term *allegorical* here has a narrow technical meaning in medieval biblical interpretation; all the last three levels are in fact forms of allegory). What all allegories, in the main sense current in literary studies, have in common is that they never refer directly to their metaphorical target. Direct reference is only to the metaphorical source constructed as a fictional situation.

Not surprisingly, the term allegory has more than one sense. Historically, it originates in the Greek rhetorical tradition where *allegoria*, whose meaning in terms of its morphological composition is “other speaking,” was used at first to refer simply to all forms of figurative language. This sense subsequently narrowed, although it still remains much wider than the modern literary sense characterized earlier. It could designate anything from a single extended metaphor up to a work such as *The Pilgrim’s Progress* (Bunyan, 1984). This wider sense still influences some, mainly nonliterary, writers. Bromiley (1979) and Goatly (1997), for example, understood allegory as including or even as consisting of extended metaphor, understood as a metaphor whose linguistic expression extends over at least two clauses. This wider sense does valuably emphasize that allegory is an integral part of general metaphorical conceptualization and expression. It also, however, overlooks an important distinction.

Allegory in the narrower sense contains no direct target reference. Extended metaphors do, however. They contain language that relates overtly to both the source and target. We see this in the following striking extended metaphor from Charles Causley’s (1975) “A Ballad for Katherine of Aragon:”

O war is a *casual mistress*
And the world is *her double bed*
She has a few charms in her mechanised arms
But you wake up and find yourself dead. (Causley, 1975, p. 14)

Conceptually, this is a single metaphor continuously involving the same source, a mistress and her setting, and the same target, war. Linguistically, it extends over four clauses. The metaphorical expressions relating to the source are in bold. All the other expressions relate directly to the target and so are literal. (The procedure for metaphorical identification used here is that being developed by the Pragglejaz group [www.let.w.nl/pragglejaz]). The contrast with works such as The Pilgrim’s Progress (Bunyan, 1984) or Dante’s La Divina Comedia, where there is no direct target reference at all, is clear. This article argues that by drawing a distinction between allegory and extended metaphor, we can gain important insights into the nature of blending in particular and cognitive semantics in general. It therefore uses the term allegory in its narrower sense, that is, the main current literary sense.

This article argues that the fact that allegorical scenes are fictional situations means that they are not, and cannot be, blended spaces. The metaphorical language in an extended metaphor is by contrast used to set up a blended space. (Causley’s [1975] extended metaphor, which is analyzed in detail later, is a clear and striking example of a metaphorical blend). When someone identifies an allegorical scene directly as a blended space, he or she reflects a tendency to identify mental spaces, of which blended spaces are a subset, with (fragmentary) possible worlds. Such an identification expresses a deep misunderstanding about the nature of both mental spaces and possible worlds. Fauconnier (1985/1994) repeatedly emphasized that mental spaces are not possible worlds or fragments thereof. The study of allegory helps to emphasize this nonidentity. Yet, as we shall see, although not themselves blended spaces, allegorical scenes are inspired by such spaces. Allegories are, after all, superextended metaphors, metaphors extended to the point where all direct target reference is eliminated. Although they are different from extended metaphors, they are still related to them. Although the latter directly set up metaphorical blends, the former have their origin in such blends. To grasp that allegorical scenes are still not themselves blended spaces, however, has significant implications for cognitive semantics. Cognitive semantics has demonstrated that the semantics of natural language is not a formal or truth conditional semantics. It must still, however, give an account of how reference and truth conditions arise; that is, show how psychological structures of meaning interface with reference and truth conditions. To gain an insight into the sources of the imaginative power of allegory and extended metaphor is to see something of this interface. To some such claims for a “mere” literary analysis seems surprising. In the context of cognitive semantics,

1From Charles Causley’s Collected Poems 1951–1975, reprinted by permission of Macmillan.
however, with its recognition of the central cognitive role of the imagination, there is nothing surprising about them at all.

**THE CENTRAL ISSUE EXEMPLIFIED**

There are many different kinds of allegory, yet a characteristic of them all are those frequently fantastic images that led C. S. Lewis to speak of allegory’s “free creation of the marvelous” (1958, p. 74). Daniel 7:3–8, for example, presents four beasts from the sea, representing four empires or epochs, which are all fantastically bizarre. The third, representing Persia, is *like a leopard* but with four wings and four heads (Daniel 7:5–6). Apocalyptic allegories continually employ such bizarre, fantastic imagery. In *The Faerie Queene*, the figure of Atè, or Discord, is cross-eyed, her tongue is forked, each half talking against the other, she has misshapen and ill-matched ears, a long and a short foot each going in opposite directions, and hands whose movements oppose each other (Spenser, 1978, pp. 569–572). In *The Pilgrim’s Progress*, those who have had their eyes taken out by Giant Despair are blind men stumbling around a field of tombs, repeatedly bumping into them (Bunyan, 1984, p. 99). Rosamund Tuve (1966) observed of Guillame de Deguileville’s 14th-century allegory “La Pèlerinage de la Vie Humaine,” [*“The Pilgrimage of the Life of Man”*] that its images have the fantastic quality often associated with the Baroque period. She concluded that this fantastic quality is not restricted to Baroque allegory but is intrinsic to the genre of allegory itself.

Turner (1996) gave an analysis of Dante’s *Inferno XXVIII* that relates the fantastic qualities of allegory to blending (see Appendix for the relevant section of *Inferno XVIII*). The character Dante, in the company of Virgil, meets Bertran de Born swinging his severed head by the hair *a guisa di lanterna* [like a lantern]. De Born’s divided state is a metaphorically appropriate punishment for his sin. The conventional metaphor that maps physical division onto social division makes the division of his head from his body correspond metaphorically to his sin of dividing father and son. (The same conventional metaphor also underlies Spenser’s Atè, mentioned earlier [Spenser, 1978, pp. 569–572]). However, Turner argued, the full force of this correspondence cannot be understood by a simple two-domain model of conceptual metaphor. It requires a blending model with at least four mental spaces: a source, target, generic, and blended space.

De Born’s unnatural physical division induces the inference that he is an unnatural sinner. This inference, Turner (1996) argued, cannot originate in the metaphor’s source and target spaces alone. There is nothing unnatural about physical division as such, and neither is turning father against son of itself sinful. If the father was “an evil infidel warrior,” it would not be wrong to alienate him and his son. The central argument for the existence of metaphorical blending is employed here. Metaphorical inferences frequently arise that cannot originate from a source and
target domain alone. A surgeon referred to as a butcher is inferred to be incompetent, yet neither butchers nor surgeons are per se incompetent. The inference of incompetence arises from a blended space creatively combining and elaborating elements of both source and target spaces. A surgeon hacking his patient with a cleaver would indeed be incompetent. It is from this emergent structure in the blended space that the inference of incompetence arises. Similarly, it is claimed, the inference that de Born is an unnatural sinner arises in a blended space that creatively fuses the source element of physical division with the target element of de Born himself. This results in the emergent structure of the unnatural image of de Born swinging his head *a guisa di lanterna.* This then projects back the inference of unnaturalness to the sin of the target space.

In fact, Turner’s (1996) argument for blending in *Inferno XXVIII* has some weaknesses. Turning close family members against each other, especially father and son in an intensely patriarchal society, is surely prima facie wrong. The “evil infidel warrior” case would be at best a special exception. The unnatural physical division of de Born thus emphases rather than establishes an unnatural sinfulness that is already present in the target space. Yet there is still good reason to relate the de Born image to blending, for it creatively combines source and target elements rather than simply establishing correspondences between them. No algorithm determines what gets fused with what in a blended space. There is, instead, a degree of unpredictable creativity. In this case, physical division in the source space does not correspond to de Born in the target space but to his sin, yet physical division is fused with de Born in a blended space becoming a punishment for the sin which is its counterpart (Turner, 1996). The result is the fantastic image of de Born swinging his head.

Dante’s de Born does clearly originate in a metaphorical blend. This does not, however, mean that he is himself an element in a blended space or that the *Inferno* is a combination of such spaces. Yet this is what Turner (1996) asserted: “Dante’s *Inferno* is an encyclopedic display of local blended spaces, but in addition, at a higher level, it is a single monumental synoptic blended space” (p. 63). A blended space is a mental space in the sense of Fauconnier (1985/1994). Fauconnier stated that mental spaces must not be confused with possible worlds: “They are not representations of reality or of partial ‘possible worlds’” (Fauconnier, 1985/1994, p. 152). Language cannot therefore refer to elements in mental spaces, because, not being possible worlds, they do not contain the kind of entities capable of being referents. Instead, it *sets up* mental spaces and reference then proceeds from these:

I shall speak throughout of elements being set up mentally, pointed to and identified by language forms; the language forms do not refer to such elements. If there is to be reference it will go from elements in the mental spaces to the objects referred to. (Fauconnier, 1985/1994, p. 2)
The idea that mental spaces are not possible worlds is fundamental to Fauconnier’s (1985/1994) concept of “backstage cognition,” which rejects the idea that natural language sentences algorithmically determine sets of truth conditions (pp. xvii–xlvi). If Fauconnier is right, the contents of mental spaces are never referred to, except metalinguistically. They do the referring. This means that, if the *Inferno*’s characters existed in a blended, that is to say mental, space, the *Inferno* itself would contain no reference to these characters. This is highly counterintuitive. In the third and fourth stanzas of the de Born episode, for example, there seem to be clear references to Dante, to de Born’s headless body, and to his severed head (see the Appendix). There is, of course, all the logical complexity of reference to actual persons in a nonactual, fictional, situation, but that there is reference of some sort seems indubitable. The de Born episode itself cannot therefore be, or exist in, a blended space.

**MENTAL SPACES AND POSSIBLE SITUATIONS**

The reason for accepting Fauconnier’s (1985/1994) account of mental spaces is that it provides a unified account of a range of apparently diversified phenomena that have greatly puzzled philosophers and theorists of language and logic. It can only do this because mental spaces do not represent actual or possible worlds but rather enable a form of cognitive manipulation free from the constraints of representing such worlds. They constitute what Fauconnier (1997) referred to as “level C,” C being for cognition (pp. 35–37). Level C connects up with actual and possible worlds because it “provide(s) various real world inferences and action patterns” (Fauconnier, 1997, p. 36). Its ability to do this, however, rests on its not directly representing such worlds.

One of the best ways to understand level C is to consider the role of counterpart relations within it. The phrase *counterpart relations* recalls the counterpart theory of David Lewis (1973). Counterpart relations in mental space theory, however, play a completely different role from that which they play in Lewis’s (1973) modal logic. For Lewis, counterpart relations hold between entities in different possible worlds. To say that two such entities are counterparts is to say that we will, when using everyday language, judge them to be the same entity in different possible worlds (Forbes, 1985; Lewis, 1973). Counterpart relations for Lewis account directly for our judgments of possible identity. As an account of such judgments, Lewis’s theory has problems (Forbes, 1985). More to the point here, however, is the difference in principle between Lewis’s and Fauconnier’s (1985/1994) use of counterpart relations. For Fauconnier, such relations do not explain intuitions of logically possible identity but rather a much wider range of intuitions that may involve identity, analogy, metaphor, metonymy, or any other form of correspondence whatsoever.
The distinctiveness of Fauconnier’s (1985/1994) use of counterpart relations is well shown by an example he cited from Lakoff: “If X had been born twins, they would have hated each other” (p. 38). What is to be accounted for here is clearly not an intuition of logical possibility. It is logically impossible for one person, here X, to be identical with two different, albeit only possible, people, here the pair of twins. Two mental spaces have been set up, one for the protasis and the other for the apodosis. X in the first space has as his counterparts the twins in the second. The most obvious basis for the second space’s construction is that the twins are identical twins and perfect copies of X. It is this similarity that motivates the counterpart relations. Questions about what sort of thing exactly X’s counterparts are and what exactly their relation to X is simply do not arise. Their mental space is set up to facilitate an inference and has no metaphysical or realistic significance. The anaphoric relation of they to X, plus the Identification Principle (Fauconnier, 1985/1994, p. 1), allows they to set up the twins as counterparts of X. This results in an inference about the nature of reality. Because the twins, who are perfect copies of X, find each other hateful in their mental space, X in reality is a hateful person. Yet although a real inference has been generated, it has been generated via a level C that has no realistic or metaphysical status. What is the exact status of those twins? What exactly is their relation to X? Might one or the other of them be identical with X? These are unanswerable questions. They would not be unanswerable if the twins existed in a possible world. They “exist,” however, only at level C, only to facilitate a reasoning task. Fauconnier (1985/1994) observed that such facilitation can even involve logically inconsistency, as in a proof by reductio ad absurdum (p. 122, note 8). No logically possible world of course can ever be logically inconsistent.

Yet if level C enables reasoning about reality, it must at some point connect with that reality. The nature of this connection is in some ways straightforward and in others profoundly mysterious. One can simply construe a mental space as a model of reality (Fauconnier, 1997). If the mental space “fits” reality, then we have truth. The crucial point is that mental spaces can be and often are manipulated without assuming that they fit reality. Only those spaces assumed to have such a fit give rise to truth conditions. The hateful twins space, for example, clearly has no such fit. Its setting up, however, indirectly attributes hatefulness to X in the mental space set up for X. Construing this space as fitting reality is then equivalent to asserting the truth of the proposition that X is hateful. This is all quite straightforward. What is mysterious, as Fauconnier (1997) observed, is how in practice we arrive at criteria for determining which spaces do and do not fit reality. A further point is that we do not only need spaces that fit reality. We also need spaces that fit merely possible realities or worlds, for modal as well as categorical propositions have truth conditions. To bring in possible worlds, however, is to bring in the vexed question of their metaphysical or ontological status. For unlike mental spaces, they unavoidably raise the question of their own status.
Narrative fictions are like mental spaces in not being direct models of reality. Unlike mental spaces, however, they do directly involve possible worlds. These have played a significant role in narrative theory in recent decades. Semino provided a good summary of these developments (1997, pp. 57–85). Insightful taxonomies of fiction, for example, have been developed in terms of the logical accessibility of fictional possible worlds from our actual world, or, in more everyday terms, the extent to which fictions are like or unlike the actual world (Semino, 1997, pp. 77–83). Semino pointed out two important problems with any direct construal of fictions as possible worlds. The first is that a possible world is complete, consisting of absolutely everything that is the case in some possible universe. Fictions, by contrast, are incomplete. A great deal of what does or does not obtain in a fictional world is left unspecified, for example, the number of Lady Macbeth’s children. The second problem is that fictions sometimes contain logical inconsistencies, whereas a possible world by definition contains none.

The issue of incompleteness has an answer in terms of modal logic. There are systems working with possibilities or possible situations that are as logically powerful as those using possible worlds (Forbes, 1985). Such a possible situation is a fragment of a possible world, or, more precisely, a fragment of each of that infinite number of possible worlds each of which is a possible extension of any given possible situation. Fictions can thus be naturally construed as possible situations. Yet, although situation logic has the same logical power as possible world logic, it is much more complicated. Modal logicians therefore usually work with possible worlds, knowing that anything that can be proved with them can also be proved with possible situations (Forbes, 1985). This implies that it is implausible that our cognitive manipulation of the possible situations we imagine is effected via the complications of situation logic. Situation logic tells us about the logical status of our fictions but not about our cognitive manipulation of them. As Semino (1997) contends that, despite its insights into the nature of fiction, possible world theory—and this applies all the more to situation theory—needs to be supplemented by an alternative (although not incompatible) approach dealing with text worlds in terms of cognitive psychology (p. 119). Semino’s approach, like that of mental space theory, recognizes that cognitive processes have their own autonomy as well as interfacing with issues of logic and truth. Yet this interface cannot be ignored.

The status of fictions construed as possible situations is tied to that of the metaphysical status of possible worlds in general, because possible situations are fragments of possible worlds. Possible worlds, unlike mental spaces, unavoidably pose the question of their metaphysical status. Do they really in some sense exist? The most straightforward answer to this question is the modal realism of Lewis (1986). Lewis inferred from the fact that the modal operators of necessity and possibility can be treated as quantifiers ranging over possible worlds, that possible worlds really do exist. He followed Quine’s (1961) principle of ontology that to be is to be the value of a bound variable, although he did not follow Quine’s doubts about log-
ical necessity. If possible worlds function as the values of variables bound by the operators of necessity and possibility, then, he inferred, they must exist, quite literally, by being as real as our actual world, although necessarily isolated from each other. Within this framework, Malory’s *Morte d’Arthur* (2004) and George Eliot’s *Middlemarch* (1999) would, because each defines a possible situation, refer indirectly to an infinite number of possible worlds, each of which is a completion of their fictional situations, every one of these worlds being as real as the world we inhabit. This is surely realism gone crazy. Forbes (1985) proposed an alternative that does away with possible worlds altogether. His proof theoretic approach does not treat the modal operators as quantifiers but adds an actuality operator to them. This provides a logical system identical in power to the standard possible world apparatus but one carrying none of the ontological commitments of that apparatus. The basic idea is to take modal sentences not as referring to possible worlds or situations, but as conforming to a set of modal axioms. These axioms lay down which propositions can be true, which cannot be true, and which must necessarily be true. Modal logic, therefore, instead of expressing intuitions about the existence of possible worlds, expresses direct intuitions about what is possible and what is necessary. (The philosophical status of such intuitions is beyond the scope of this article.) We can thus, instead of talking of possible worlds or situations, talk of possible truths, possible references, and possible predications without committing ourselves to modal realism.

Forbes (1985) did admit that we find it natural to think in terms of possible worlds and of propositions being true or false in them. This has a natural cognitive explanation in terms of conceptual metaphor and blending. Something more abstract is generally conceived of in terms of something more experientially basic. With modal logic, the target space is that of abstract propositions and the source space that of worlds, thought of as separated areas in a single physical space with entities located in them. The blended space contains counterparts of the physical worlds that contain counterparts of the abstract propositions. The inferences the blend generates are projected back to the target space of propositions. We can thus think via a metaphorical blend of possible worlds or situations with propositions being true or false in them without committing ourselves to their literal existence. When Dante in *Inferno XXVIII* referred to Bertran de Born, he was not referring to a really existing entity in a really existing possible situation or set of possible worlds. He was simply making a possible rather than an actual reference. In the rest of this article, I talk sometimes of possible situations or worlds. In so doing, I talk, and no doubt think, metaphorically, without committing myself to the literal existence of such situations or worlds. To make this clear, I also at times talk literally of possible truths, possible references, and possible predications.

In addition to the question raised for the possible world approach to fiction by the incompleteness of fictional worlds, we saw that Semino (1997) also raised that of the logical impossibility of some fictional worlds. She mentioned Dolezel’s dis-
cussion of Robbe-Grillet’s *La Maison de Rendez-vous* [*The Meeting House*] in which “the same place is and is not the setting of the novel, the same event is claimed to have occurred in different ways, and so on” (p. 65). These kinds of logical contradiction certainly do occur in some fictions, particularly in recent postmodernist fiction. Because the logically impossible is strictly unimaginable, the effect is a kind of “staggering” of the mind which cannot take in what it is “presented” with, providing the basis for a range of possible pragmatic interpretations. A logically contradictory fiction may, for example, be interpreted as a hyperbolic metaphor for the incomprehensible nature of the world. The existence of impossible fictions does complicate the definition of fiction in terms of possible situations or worlds, but without invalidating the basic insight of this approach. Most fictions are logically consistent, logically impossible ones being a special case. Their logically contradictory properties are illuminated by the analyses of modal logic, whereas their raison d’être is to be understood in terms of their pragmatic point. We can say, therefore, that fictions are usually possible situations, or, more literally, consist of sets of compossible possible truths, while allowing for the special cases in which the criterion of full logical compossibility is not met.

Some mental spaces seem similar at first glance to impossible fictions. On closer inspection, however, they prove to be very different, and this further illuminates the difference between them and possible situations. A good instance of such apparent similarity is given by the hateful twins example already analyzed. If interpreted literally, with the pronoun *they* referring to two different possible persons both identical to the same actual person X, this would be logically contradictory. Its appearance of logical deviance does produce an effect of stylistic foregrounding. Yet this is very different from the mental “stagger” induced by impossible fictions, for their logical contradictions cannot be resolved. On any normal interpretation, however, as we have seen, *they* simply sets up two counterparts of X. The space these occupy has no definable metaphysical status, existing solely to facilitate reasoning. It is in itself internally consistent and no further questions about its logical or metaphysical status arise. Instead of the addressee’s mind being “staggered,” it simply ignores the apparent contradiction and grasps the literal point: A is hateful. Mental spaces exist only to facilitate reasoning and do not pose questions about their ultimate status. We cannot by contrast avoid trying to make full sense of fictional situations. Their metaphysical status is implicitly at issue because they, unlike the mental spaces from which reference and predication proceed, are constituted by possible reference and predication.

**BLENDING IN EXTENDED METAPHOR**

Extended metaphor, we saw, is different from allegory because it contains language that relates directly to both the source and target. Like any instance of
metaphor processed “online,” it sets up a metaphorical blended space. This is obviously true, for example, of the extended metaphor created by Charles Causley (1975), quoted earlier. The casual mistress is fused with war in a blended space giving rise to inferences such as the following: (a) War has many attractive elements, (b) It is indifferent to its participants, (c) They may overlook or forget this indifference, and (d) It is frequently fatal. This is, in fact, one of those cases where the inferences could be derived from the source and target spaces alone: (a) A casual mistress is attractive to her lover but indifferent to him, (b) Her lover may overlook or forget her indifference, and (c) War is frequently fatal. Yet a blending analysis is still needed. Causley created a scenario in which war seems, strangely and impossibly, to be a mistress. No simple source to target projection can account for this effect, for such a projection could produce only a correlation between war and mistress, not this mysterious sense of fusion. For myself, the ordinary reader to whom I have the easiest access, one result of this is a fantastic visual image of a woman rearing up from a supine position on a bed with opening mechanical arms. This is the war-mistress. Such fantastic images display the process of blending by their mingling of source and target features. They are blends that become at least partially conscious.

Yet how can war be a mistress? Identity between an abstract and a concrete entity is logically impossible and we cannot imagine the logically impossible, so how can we elaborate the scenario of war as a mistress? (Those with Quinean doubts about logical necessity still have to admit the psychological impossibility of imagining such a literal identity.) Barnden and Lee’s (1999) concept of a “pretense cocoon” provides a valuable insight here. This concept is part of ATT-Meta, a rule-based system of reasoning. The basic idea is that a metaphor, such as The two ideas were in different store rooms in John’s mind, is first construed literally. This is the setting up of the pretense cocoon, the pretense here being that John’s mind is literally a physical space. A number of literal inferences, such as “John cannot simultaneously operate physically on the two ideas because they are physically separated,” are then derived. Only after this are conceptual metaphors, such as MIND AS PHYSICAL SPACE, used to derive metaphorical inferences from these literal inferences, such as “John cannot simultaneously operate mentally on the two ideas” (Barnden & Lee, 1999, pp. 34–37). Pretense cocoons can incorporate target as well as source elements, so they are very like blended spaces (Barnden, 2001). They show how we can feel that war is a casual mistress, although this is logically impossible. We pretend that war is literally a casual mistress for reasoning purposes. This pretense has tremendous psychological force and integrity due to its cognitive role. With Causley (1975), we can even identify the point at which the pretense comes to a sudden brutal end. At “you wake up and find yourself dead,” the blended scenario collides with the impossibility of waking up dead. The literal pretense of the war-mistress ends and a crucial inference is projected back to the target space: war kills.
If blended spaces involve a form of pretense, then this emphasizes that like mental spaces in general, they exist only for purposes of reasoning. They are not models of possible worlds or situations. Their pretense suspends all questions of ontological status. This is emphasized by another of Causley’s extended metaphors:

Time like a saucy trooper took my true lover
In the stiff corn that stands above the bay
Never a backward glance he gave his new love,
But whistled a tune and slowly rode away. (Causley, 1975, p. 91)²

The previous extended metaphor developed a metaphorical blend and then brought its pretense into conflict with the poem’s situation. Here, blend and situation are interwoven from the first line of the first verse. The conceptual metaphor TIME IS A CAUSER provides a basic context. With the passing of time, it seems a change took place in the speaker’s lover in a field of corn above a bay resulting in the speaker losing his lover. This defines the extended metaphor’s target space. (The poem’s second verse indicates that the change in question is death, a possibility already “in the air.”) The source space is that of a swaggering trooper who scoops up a girl onto the back of his horse and rides away with her. The effect is strange. As with the war-mistress, a blended space is set up in which time is a trooper and his act of abduction is the lover’s dying. (The metaphorical items in the second line relate to a blend in which the corn is humanized; all other metaphorical items relate to the time-trooper blend.) The elaborate extension gives this pretense an intensity that interacts strangely with the situation defined as actual by the poem. This situation is underspecified. Even if she did die in the corn field, we have no idea how. The blended scenario, on the other hand, is developed in vivid detail, seeming in many ways more real than the poetically actual situation. Yet it is not. It is a pretense. The result is a haunted landscape. The trooper and his horse seem to be there, feel as if they are there, but one knows they are not. They are like ghosts.

This is not the first time that elements in a blended space have been compared to ghosts. Fauconnier and Turner (1998), discussing the nonmetaphorical Regata blend, quoted from the magazine Latitude 38, which wrote of “the ghost of the clipper Northern Light,” and continued themselves to use the term ghost (p. 155). (The clipper has been set up in a blended space where it races impossibly against a yacht existing 140 years after it.) Ghosts are strange because their status is indefinable, neither clearly living nor dead. To speak of elements in blends as ghosts emphasizes that their status is indefinable. It is indefinable because blended spaces exist only for purposes of reasoning. They are a “mere” pretense and their being a mere pretense rules out any question of defining their metaphysical status. They are radically different from possible situations whose metaphysical and ontological status is always in question.

INFERNO XXVIII: A POSSIBLE SITUATION

Extended metaphors elaborate metaphorical blended spaces to an unusual degree. Allegory, however, is a superextended metaphor, one extended to the point where all directly target-related language is eliminated. This means that there is no longer any of that mixing or “blending” of source- and target-related language that is the linguistic basis for conceptual blending. The language of allegory simply refers to and describes the metaphorical source. It thus consists of a set of possible references and predications, or, to speak less literally, the source is construed as a possible, fictional, situation. This situation has allegorical significance but exists first of all in its own fictional right. The de Born episode is not a blend but a possible situation.

Many aspects of the de Born scene emphasize its status as a possible situation. The main characters in the scene, de Born and Dante, were actual persons, although their meeting is fictional. That is, speaking literally, there is a series of possible references and predications, a number of whose referents actually existed. The fact that the main characters were actual, although their meeting is fictional, undoubtedly adds to the scene’s sense of reality. Many have commented on the Inferno’s realism (Auerbach, 1968). De Born, for example, is described in vivid physical detail, clearly located physically at the foot of the bridge in relation to Dante. Dante’s realism, Auerbach (1968) argued, was significantly inspired by the very doctrine of allegorical, biblical interpretation he appealed to in the Can Grande letter, for this always emphasized the importance of the first of the four biblical senses, the literal sense. The contrast between de Born’s vivid physical reality and Causley’s (1975) “saucy trooper” haunting a vaguely specified landscape is extreme. De Born seems to be physically there. His physical reality is at least as fantastic as Causley’s war-mistress with her mechanized arms, but his impact rests on his seeming, physical, actuality. The saucy trooper and the war-mistress are elements set up in blended spaces. De Born, by contrast, is a referent in a physically specified, possible situation.

Something that further emphasizes the status of the de Born scene as a possible situation is the response it contains to its own fantastic nature. De Born’s carrying his head is physiologically impossible. It is not, however, logically impossible. This enables it to be imagined, and imagined vividly, and this in turn naturally gives rise to the question of how exactly it is possible. This question is raised in Dante: “Com’esser può, quei sa che sí governa” (“How that may be, he knows who governs so”).3 With mental spaces, of which blended spaces are a subset, the question of how their contents are possible does not arise, for they have no definable metaphysical status. Such questions can only arise in relation to possible worlds or situations such as the de Born scene.

An allegory’s metaphorical meaning is projected from its fictional situations, not directly from the language used to present these. Although the language of extended

3All translations from the Italian are my own.
metaphor relates to both the metaphorical source and target, that of allegory relates directly only to the source. Yet, as mentioned earlier, the thesis that the language of allegory is literal needs to be qualified. Doing so emphasizes still further the status of allegorical scenes as possible situations. Few, if any, discourses contain no metaphorical language. The referential target of an allegory’s metaphorical language, however, or more accurately of the target spaces which this language sets up and from which reference then proceeds, is the allegory’s fictional situation not its ultimate allegorical subject. In Dante’s *Inferno XXVIII*, for example, the words *lanterna* and *lucerna* are applied metaphorically to de Born’s head, which exists literally in the fictional situation. All the italicized words in the Appendix, that is, all those judged metaphorical, will similarly be found to relate to entities in the fictional situation. A distinction between metaphorically- and literally-used language can only be drawn in relation to a possible situation. Language relating directly to that situation is literal; language relating to it indirectly is not. We can distinguish literal from metaphorical language in the de Born scene because we have a possible situation that allows us to judge which words relate to it directly and which indirectly.

Allegorical scenes frequently contain fantastic entities, such as de Born with his severed head. This indicates a close connection between allegory and blending, for blends of their very nature are fantastic. Turner’s (1996) analysis of the de Born scene does not establish that allegorical scenes actually are blends, for such scenes we have seen are possible situations. If, however, his analysis is interpreted as showing allegorical scenes to be inspired by blending, then it is profoundly insightful. Yet if the relation between an allegorical scene and the blended space inspiring it is not one of identity, what exactly is it? Dante must first, in the process of composition, have projected a blended space with a de Born counterpart swinging his head, one that must have had its origins in projections from a pair of source and target spaces of exactly the kind that Turner (1996) described. The fantastic details of this space must then have been projected back to the target space and was then construed as a situation model, that is, a set of possible references and predications. What is notable about allegory is that it allows more than is usual to be projected back from the blended to the target space. The only ultimate constraint, in addition to the constraints of metaphorical mapping, is that of logical possibility. When a reader constructs the fictional situation in reception, he must also reproject the metaphorical blended space and its source and target origins from that fictional situation to understand the allegory. In this way, we can see that, although allegorical scenes are not blended spaces, they do have their origins in such spaces.

**CONCLUSION**

Allegory, in the sense currently dominant in literary contexts, is related to but significantly different from extended metaphor. An extended metaphor, like linguistic
metaphors generally, sets up a metaphorical blend. Blending processes are usually unconscious. The unusual elaboration of an extended metaphor, however, brings these processes partially to consciousness. The reader, in addition to deriving inferences from the blend, becomes aware of its contents. This awareness can express itself in a mental image or an undefined sense of “presence.” The bizarreness or eeriness often associated with these effects is a consequence of the ontologically undefined status of blends. These exist solely as tools of reasoning without any metaphysical status. Blends, as mental spaces, are thus radically different kinds of things from possible worlds.

Allegories can be regarded as superextended metaphors. The result of their “superextension,” however, is to remove all language relating directly to the metaphorical target. What remains is language that refers to and describes the metaphorical source, both literally and nonliterally. What this language is referring to and describing is clearly not actual; it therefore contains a series of possible references and predications. To speak less literally, the metaphorical source is construed as a possible situation, that is, a fragment of the possible worlds that are its possible completions. Allegorical scenes, that is, metaphorical sources interpreted as possible situations, are not blended spaces. They have, instead, a definite metaphysical status, that of frequently fantastic possibilities. The fantastic properties of these possibilities originate in processes of blending. Although they are not themselves blends, allegorical scenes derive from blends. If extended metaphor exploits the indefinable ontological status of mental spaces to create its strange effects, allegory produces the fantastic effect of bringing over the contents of blended spaces into fictional actuality.

It is frequently emphasized that blending produces real-world effects and inferences. It can impose precisely quantifiable truth conditions on the actual world (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998). Yet blending is clearly part of Fauconnier’s (1997) level C. Its direct role in extended metaphor and its indirect role in allegory show vividly how it does real cognitive work at a level prior to and independent of the specification of any truth conditions, actual or possible. Yet blending, and level C generally, do give rise to truth conditions. Cognitive semantics, to be complete, needs to provide a precise account of how this happens. When exactly, for example, do correspondence relations between mental spaces get interpreted in terms of logically possible identity? What are the factors motivating such interpretation? Any answer to questions like this is obviously far beyond the scope of this article. What this article has done, hopefully, is to use the distinction between mental spaces and possible situations to reveal an important distinction between two kinds of closely related metaphoric phenomena, extended metaphor and allegory, and so to account for subtle but real differences in the imaginative effects of these phenomena. This underlines the importance both of the distinction between level C and the level of reference and truth and of the relations between them. It points to the need for cognitive semantics to give a full account of these relations.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX
Dante’s Inferno XVIII (Lines 112–142),
With English Translation

Ma io rimasi a riguardar lo stuolo
E vidi cosa ch’io avrei paura
Sanzia piú provar, di contarolo solo
Se non che coscienza m’assicura
La buona compagnia che l’uom frangheggia
Sotto l’asbergo sentirsi pura
Io vido certo, e ancor par ch’io ‘l veggia
Un busto sanza capo andar si come
Andavan li altri de la trista greggia
E ‘l capo tronco tenea per le chiome
E quel mirava noi e dicea: “Oh me!”
Di sé facea a sé stesso lanterna
Ed eran due in uno e uno in due:
Come ‘esser può, quei sa che sí governa
Quando diritto al piè del ponte fue
Levò ’l braccio alto conutta la testa
Per apressame le parole sue,
Che fuoro: “Or vedi la pena molesta
Tu che, spirando, vai veggendoci morti:
Vedi s’alcuna è grande come questa
E perche tu di me novella porti,
Sappi ch’i son Bertran dal Bornio, quelli
Che diedi al re giovane ma’ conforti.
Io feci il padre a ’l figlio in se ribelli
Achitofèl no fé piú d’Absolone
E di David coi malvagi punzelli
Perch’io parti’ così giunti persone,
Partito porto il mio cerebro, lasso!
Dal suo principio ch’e in questo troncone,
Così s’osserva in me lo contropasso.”

112 But I remained gazing on the crowd
And saw something I would be afraid
114 To tell without more proof
If conscience did not reassure me
That good company that frees a man
117 Under the armour of feeling pure
Certainly I saw and still seem to see
A body without a head going just as
Went the others of that sad herd
It held the severed head by its hair
That looked at us and said “Ah me!”
123 Of itself it made itself a lamp
And they were two in one and one in two;
126 How that may be he knows who governs so
When it was right at the bridge’s foot
It raised its arm with the head entire
To bring its words closer to us,
Which were: “Now see the great penalty
You who, breathing, go gazing on the dead
See if any is as great as this
And so you can carry back news of me,
Know that I am Bertran de Born, he
That gave the young king evil consolation.
I made father and son rebels one to the other
Achitophel did no worse by Absolom
132 And David with his evil urgings
Because I parted persons joined,
I carry my brain parted, alas,
135 That the young king evil consolation.
I made father and son rebels one to the other
Achitophel did no worse by Absolom
138 And David with his evil urgings
Because I parted persons joined,
I carry my brain parted, alas,
From its beginning in this trunk,
In me is seen the return blow.”

1Translated from the Italian by Peter Crisp