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\pard\plain\pard\qc{\plain\b\f2010\fs28\cf1 Chapter 8\par }
\pard\qc{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qc{\plain\b\f2010\fs36\cf1 Property Rights\par }
\pard\qc{\plain\b\f2010\fs28\cf1 Original Acquisition and Lockean Provisos \par }
\pard\qc{\plain\b\f2010\fs28\cf1 \par }
\pard\qc{\plain\b\f2010\fs24\cf1 Introduction\par }
\pard\qc{\plain\b\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Many writers in the liberal tradition have agreed that at least some sort of \'d2first appropriation\'d3 reasonably supports ownership by an individual, but have insisted that it does so only if that individual\'d5s appropriation leaves, in the words of Locke, \'d2eno}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ugh and as good for others,\'d3 a condition that has come to be known as the \'d2Lockean Proviso.\'d3 Interest in that proviso among philosophers was greatly stimulated by Robert Nozick\'d5s discussion,}
{\plain\up5\f2010\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up5\f21\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  }
{\plain\f2010\fs24\cf1 Robert Nozick, }
{\plain\f2010\fs24\cf1 Anarchy, State, and Utopia}
{\plain\f2010\fs24\cf1  (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 174-182.}
{\plain\f20\fs20\cf1  }
}}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  followed by many others. But my interest in this investigation is neither to catalog their views}
{\plain\up5\f2010\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up4\f2010\fs9\cf1 \up4 \chftn }
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1   I am particularly unhappy to have to omit the extensive discussion deserved by Eric Mack\'d5s \'d2The Self-Ownership Proviso: A new and Improved Lockean Proviso,\'d3 \-}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 Social Philosophy and Policy}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1  12 #1, Winter 1995, 186-218.In Mack\'d5s view, \'d2the recognition that each person owes others as self-owners includes abstention from the disablement of their world-interactive faculties, talents, and energies.\'d3 We can disable these by making that world virtu}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 ally unavailable to them as an object of interaction. My main excuse for not discussing Mack\'d5s important paper is lack of space; my secondary excuse is that I do not believe his thesis has a real-world divergence from my own, however much it would affect t}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 hings in worlds very different from our own. But his paper richly deserves a careful reading by those pursing this topic. He and I are also have benefited from papers by John T. sanders, such as \'d2Justice and the Initial Aquisition of Private Property,\'d3 }
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy,}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1  10 (1987), pp. 367-400.}
}}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  nor to arrive at the definitive interpretation of Locke. My thesis is twofold. First, I point out that \'d2the\'d3 Proviso is subject to a number of conspicuously different interpretations\'d0\'d0five, in my analysis, with two importantly different variants of one. S}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 econd,  one of these is also the right}
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1  }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 one\'d0\'d0not as an interpretation of Locke, but as a view about just property holding. The view I shall advocate is simpler and clearer than any of the others, avoids the conundrums to which they give rise, and provides a credible view that also has the merit }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 of reflecting actual practice among individuals, if that is regarded as a merit. Indeed, I argue, it is the only view that really makes sense. But it conspicuously fails to do what most interpreters seem to think the right doctrine }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 should}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  do: justify the imposition by the State of more or less severe restrictions on the extent of legitimate ownership of natural things in the world by particular individuals or groups. \par }
\pard\ql{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\ql{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qc{\plain\b\f2010\fs24\cf1 Liberalism}
{\plain\b\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\b\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Throughout, I shall be considering only theories that, at least provisionally, accept certain very general claims distinctive of the political and moral outlook of liberalism. For present purposes, there are four such claims:\par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 (1) The sole legitimate purpose of the State is to promote the good, in the sense just stated, of people other than the rulers themselves, rulers being included only insofar as they are citizens, not rulers.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 (2) The assessment of that good is to be made from the point of view of the individuals concerned: value, for political and social purposes, is what satisfies their preferences\'d0\'d0not what realizes somebody else\'d5s view of what they ought to prefer.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 (3) Paretianism:  If S1 is a social situation alternative to S2, and in S1 at least one (innocent) person is better off and no one worse off than in S2, then liberalism calls for preferring S1 to S2\'d0\'d0provided that S2 is not itself defective in respect of j}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ustice, in some way that can be specifically rectified.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 (4) The general thesis of self-ownership, which prohibits all utilization of people without their own uncoerced consent, which  implies everyone\'d5s negative right to \'d2life, health, or liberty,\'d3 as Locke\'d5s \'d2Law of Nature\'d3 has it.}
{\plain\up5\f2010\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up5\f2010\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn }
{\plain\f2010\fs24\cf1  Locke, }
{\plain\f2010\fs24\cf1 Second Treatise on Civil Government}
{\plain\f2010\fs24\cf1 , Ch. I, sect. 6.}
}}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1   Locke famously adds \'d4property\'d5 to that list, but we must omit it here, since the point of our inquiry is to determine whether there is such a right and if so, why. In effect, our question is whether a good case can be made for including property in Locke}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \'d5s list on the basis of the others, especially liberty.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Obviously I cannot undertake a full-scale defense of liberalism here. But many would, I think, accept these four components even if they wouldn\'d5t identify them as \'d4liberalism\'d5; and those who disagree may still find the present argument of interest, for it }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 claims that liberalism as so characterized supports property rights without incoherence; if successful, it removes one source of support for nonliberal theories.\tab \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 The subject of our discussion is whether and why full property rights may be acquired by individuals or groups of voluntarily acting individuals. We can shelve the question of the }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 extent}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  of individually owned property. In some primitive tribes, there is very little of it; and in any society much is owned by a number of persons rather than a single individual. Yet the tribes that forbid privatization to individual members declare areas of }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 forest or land the collective domain of the group, to the exclusion of all others\'d0\'d0privatization enough for our purposes. Moreover, their presence in the area before others came by is taken by them to justify their continued presence and exclusion of outsi}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ders. Whether prohibitions by the tribe on privatization by individuals within it might be valid we leave open here. Our primary focus is on activities familiar in largely agrarian and industrial societies such as our own. Within such societies, property i}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 s typically acquired by exchange. Those activities are part and parcel of property rights, but they require that at some point property was acquired in some other fashion. If there is no initial acquisition, there is no acquisition. \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qc{\plain\b\f2010\fs24\cf1 The Proviso: The General Thesis}
{\plain\f2010\fs24\cf1 \par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\ql{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 The passage containing the famous phrase goes as follows: \par }
\pard\ql{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 \par }
\pard\ql{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj\li360\ri360{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 For this }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 Labor}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1  being the unquestionable Property of the Laborer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joyned to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.}
{\plain\up4\f2010\fs9\cf1 \up4 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up5\f2010\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn }
{\plain\f2010\fs24\cf1  Locke, Section 27. (In the Everyman edition (New York: Dutton, 1966), it\'d5s on p. 130).}
}}
{\plain\up4\f2010\fs9\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj\li700\fi20\ri720{\plain\up5\f2010\fs10\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Some profess to deny the whole idea of a right to property. But even they often trace their misgivings to the \'d2proviso.\'d3 At the least, there is a general sense that without it, liberalism is incoherent. Robert Nozick generalizes this concern, suggesting th}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 at \'d2any adequate theory of justice\'d3 will have to contain a proviso to this general effect:\par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj\li360\ri360{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 A process normally giving rise to a permanent bequeathable property right in a previously unowned thing will not do so if the position of others no longer at liberty to use the thing is thereby worsened.}
{\plain\up4\f2010\fs9\cf1 \up4 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up5\f21\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn }
{\plain\up5\f21\fs10\cf1  }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1  Nozick, }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 Op. Cit.}
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 ,  p. 178.}
}}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1   \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Let\'d5s call this the \'d2General Version\'d3 of the Proviso on Acquisition. It is general in that \'d4worsened\'d5 is unspecified. Made worse }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 how}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ? In }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 what respect}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ? And what measures worsening? Theories differ. Liberalism, however, provides the general premises for an answer. If we can show that individual A\'d5s appropriation of previously unowned item x does not, by liberal standards, worsen the situation of any othe}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 r individual, then the liberal must agree that A has the right to x in the circumstances in question. That won\'d5t resolve every difficulty about particular cases, but it will show what is at issue in such disputes.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qc{\plain\b\f2010\fs24\cf1 Five Interpretations\par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\b\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 There is considerable divergence about the meaning to be attributed to the proviso as Locke states it. Here are quick descriptions of what I take to be the five options about what the relevant sort of worsening might consist in:\par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 (1) Unrestricted worsening. \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 (2) Worsening in respect of B\'d5s use of x itself.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 (3) Type-Worsening: worsening in respect of B\'d5s ability to command similar resources (such as other pieces of land).\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 (4) Utility-Worsening: reducing B\'d5s level of utility.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 (5) Worsening in respect of B\'d5s previously-acquired possessions. \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 In the following discussion, I examine the first four interpretations in enough detail to show why we cannot rationally accept them, given Liberalism. I remind the reader that these are not mainly offered as interpretation of Locke, but rather of the idea }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 I take Locke to be trying to explain. I conclude that the fifth is the correct option, not just because it is the only one left, but on the basis of further direct arguments as well. \par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qc{\plain\b\f2010\fs24\cf1 1. Unrestricted Worsenings: Excluding Nonliberal Desires}
{\plain\f2010\fs24\cf1  \par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 On the first view, A\'d5s initial appropriation must not worsen B\'d5s situation in }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 any way at all}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 . Even if what B finds wrong with A\'d5s proposed appropriation is that B simply dislikes A\'d5s having x, A\'d5s appropriation of x is forbidden. This view is essentially a straw man, but one whose errors are important to be clear about. If A\'d5s right to do somethi}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ng is subject to reversal at the hands of its negative impact on just }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 any}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  desires that }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 anyone}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  else may have, then every version of liberalism is impossible\'d0\'d0along with every possible theory of whatever kind. For whatever anyone wants to do, somebody, somewhere, won\'d5t like it\'d0\'d0antiliberal theorists, for example. Liberalism requires that desires by }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 B that F be true of A, simply as such,}
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1  }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 cannot be counted in support of publicly imposed restrictions on A\'d5s actions. \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Restricting us to \'d2nontuistic\'d3 desires, allowing only desires directed at states of the agent herself that can be characterized nonrelationally, would no doubt fulfill this requirement. But it would be extremely restrictive, and certainly far more so than }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 we need. It is enough that no authoritative imposition of restrictions on A, by government or society at large, may be made merely on the basis of B\'d5s preferences regarding A as such. Preferences of such kinds, if they are to have any weight, must be suppo}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 rted by B\'d5s }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 independently}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  specified interests. For example, the fact that B doesn\'d5t like A\'d5s taste in paintings is irrelevant, but the fact that A\'d5s painting is being hung in B\'d5s living room is not. Or again, if the fact that x would benefit C\'d0\'d0A\'d5s child, say\'d0\'d0is taken by A to be }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 a strong point in favor of x, then we will account x as a benefit to A as well, and certainly not as a point against doing x. \par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  \par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qc{\plain\b\f2010\fs24\cf1 2. Using and Excluding\par }
\pard\qc{\plain\b\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 The next three versions cover the mainstream options. All assume that the deprivation of B\'d5s capability of freely using x in the future constitutes at least a prima facie worsening, relevant for assessing proviso restrictions, but they differ considerably }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 in how they do it. On the second version, B is worsened in respect of his ability to use that very thing, x }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 itself}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 , where \'d4x\'d5 ranges over }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 particular}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  things. That B, owing to A\'d5s appropriation, can no longer use x is sufficient, as it stands, to make A\'d5s appropriation of x at least}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  prima facie}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  wrongful. Should we accept this? No. To do so would restrict legitimate appropriations to no cases at all. To begin with, many uses will destroy x, say by consuming it: if A eats the whole apple, then B doesn\'d5t. In those cases, (2) is obviously impossible}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 .\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 It may be suggested that they should share. But this rather natural idea, entertained by so many of communist persuasion, misfires in two ways. First, n people sharing an apple, or any material object, given large enough n, will satisfy no one. We can alwa}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ys find a group, G, large enough that trying to share x among all members of G will reduce the share of any given member below the level at which that person would find it worthwhile to bother with x at all. In the case of eating an apple, n is perhaps a d}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ozen. In the case of an acre of land, x will vary greatly, depending on what they want to do with it. But then, that is part of the point: people will want to do different things, and for each envisaged use there will be a value of n meeting the above cond}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ition. It will very often be just two: person A will want to do something with it that }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 cannot}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  be done by more than one person.   \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 As a major type of case in point, consider the use of x as a means of production. This inherently excludes persons other than the producers. If Jones hammers }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 now}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 , with }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 this}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  hammer, then Smith does not. Going to cooperative uses may widen the scope a little, but will never expand the user-group to include everyone. Cooperative hammering at time t by all members of group G is either impossible or so ineffective that no member }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 of G would have found it sensible to join G for that purpose. A group of women cooperatively washing linen in the creek excludes others when there would be too many for the creek, or not enough linen for the newcomers. Nonsharability beyond some threshold }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 number n is the normal situation, not the exception. Moreover, n is usually very low\'d0often just one. To require sharing, across the board, is  self-defeating. True commons illustrate rather than deny this point. In a true commons, the number who participat}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 e is small, and nonmembers are decidedly unwelcome.}
{\plain\up5\f2010\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up6\f22\fs12\cf1 \up6 \chftn }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1  See, for example, Matt Ridley, }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 The Origins of Virtue}
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1  (New York: Viking Penguin, 1997), pp. 230-233.}
}}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 We may add that social ownership and management usually }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 decreases }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 access, rather than increasing it. A man who simply owns a hammer can lend it to someone without further ado; but if it is controlled by the Central Committee, the process of securing permission to use it is likely to be so daunting as to render the hammer}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  effectively inaccessible to virtually all, apart from those with political connections, or the temerity and dexterity necessary to proceed without benefit of official approval.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Second, and more basically, prohibition of exclusive use violates liberalism. For liberalism must be neutral as between different innocent}
{\plain\up5\f2010\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up5\f21\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1  To argue that specific preferences are }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 non}
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 innocent precisely }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 because}
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1  not all could fulfill them is question-begging. It is also  absurd, as the rest of the paper will show.}
}}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1   preferences: so long as A\'d5s proposed use of x can be accomplished without damage to others, liberalism requires acceptance of that as a legitimate use.  Of course, damage to others, as we have seen in discussing version (1), must be assessed in non-quest}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ion-beggingly specified respects. Whatever x may be, }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 any }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 use of x is going to frustrate the desires of those who didn\'d5t want the user to use it, and will frustrate those who wanted to do something that required nonuse of x in that way at that time.  \par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  \par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qc{\plain\b\f2010\fs24\cf1 3. Qualitative Equivalence\par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\b\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 The third version is the most obvious reading. Here x is understood to be appropriated by A only as an instance of a type, F, such as land, which ranges fairly narrowly over things suitably }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 like}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  x. If B cannot have x, then she must instead be allowed to have some other instance of F, call it y, which is to be \'d2just as good\'d3}
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 \'d0}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 an equally fertile area of land, for example. Proposal (3) tries to assure person B, excluded from x by A\'d5s acquisition of it, that she was in effect not really excluded after all. B\'d5s exclusion from x is no problem, for B can have another instance of the }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 same }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 kind}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  of thing as A.  \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 This natural reading of Locke\'d5s words, at first glance, seems a marked improvement. But only at first glance. There is, for one thing, the obvious point that the world may not meet the condition anyway: there may not be \'d2enough\'d3 left of that kind of thing.}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  Should we disallow private appropriation of the few instances of F that there happen to be, then? Why? Is it better that all starve than that only some do? Paretianism says it is not.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Further, there is the horrendous problem of specifying the relevant kind to the satisfaction of all possible comers. Is the land down the road \'d2as good\'d3? Even if its soil is identical, perhaps the sun doesn\'d5t shine as well on it, or the shade trees along i}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ts borders are less numerous, or it\'d5s farther from town. In the end, this version of the proviso has the same implications as before, for large populations, and still more so if we include potential users in the future.}
{\plain\up5\f2010\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up5\f21\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn }
{\plain\up5\f21\fs10\cf1  }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1  See Allan Gibbard, "Natural Property Rights", }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 Nous}
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 , 1976, pp. 77-86; reprinted in Robert M. Stewart, }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 Readings in Social and Political Philosophy}
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985)  }
}}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1    \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Restricting relevant users may help: only wheat farmers need apply, say. But how can we do that and remain faithful to liberalism? All sorts of things can typically be done with any given bit of real estate or minerals, or any natural stuff. Why should tho}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 se who wish to do one thing with it be preferred to those who wish to do something else? And what about \'d4enough\'d5? Does it mean \'d4enough to get them what they want\'d5? Or should we talk instead of getting them only what they \'d2need\'d3? But that again abandons lib}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 eralism, overruling some preferences in favor of others. Nor will it work anyway: just as there is no limit to wants, so there is no limit to needs, especially self-assessed needs. So view (3) is really just as hopeless as version (2). \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 As a general comment on both (2) and (3), I note that if the set of natural resources available for possible use is insufficient relative to a particular type of demand, then that use for those people involves them in a zero-sum game: if some get all they }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 want to use in that way, others necessarily do not. There }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 cannot be a universal principle giving it to }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 everybody}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ; thus it is pointless to say that all are \'d2entitled\'d3 to it. Nor is there any use in trying to divide x up equally, giving no one enough instead of enough to some few. This most popular and natural understanding of Locke\'d5s proviso, then, comes a complete c}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ropper\'d0\'d0a lesson that has not been sufficiently learned by theorists.\par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qc{\plain\b\f2010\fs24\cf1 4. Equal-Value Theories}
{\plain\b\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qc{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 So we move to another natural thought: perhaps what must be left for others should be \'d2as good as\'d3 A\'d5s x, without imposing the impossible requirement that it be of the same }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 kind}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  as x. Obviously the next question is how we are to reckon equivalents for this purpose. One answer springs to mind: in a liberal theory, to be good for person A is to satisfy A, that is, to have utility for A. \'d4Enough and as good\'d5 will be enough, not nece}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ssarily of more F, but of some H having as much utility for A as x. This compensates B for loss of opportunity to use x. The first question for such a view is how we are to measure utility for this purpose. There are two available views: either we resort t}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 o interpersonally comparable cardinal measures, or we don\'d5t.\par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\ql{\plain\b\f2010\fs22\cf1 4a. Cardinal, Interpersonally Comparable Utility\par }
\pard\ql{\plain\b\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 This concept gets us into murky waters, since there is, to put it mildly, no agreement on the commensurability of utility, let alone just how we are to do it. But that is only one problem. The more basic one is that there is no inherent reason in liberalis}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 m why person A should regard person B\'d5s utility as equal in any way to her own, or even as having any value at all. Classical Utilitarianism, the standard-bearer of}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  interpersonally comparable utility, }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 has a fatal problem: few actually }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 want}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  the maximal sum of cardinal utility for all which it proclaims as the supreme end of action.\par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\ql{\plain\b\f2010\fs22\cf1 4b. }
{\plain\b\f2010\fs22\cf1 Preferences and Bargaining Baselines\par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\b\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 The other variant rejects that requirement. Abandoning interpersonal comparisons, it simply says that what we offer person B in return for A\'d5s exclusive possession of x should be some y such that B will be indifferent between x and y. This prima facie offe}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 rs a workable criterion. But we must now confront the question of motivation. Version (4b) enables us to get to the nub of the matter: why should A be required to do any such thing? There is one classic answer: that the world, prior to society, is a Common}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 s. If so, all are entitled to it, and so B has as a baseline for bargaining her natural share of the world\'d0\'d0a stockholder\'d5s vote in the World Corporation.\par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\ql{\plain\b\f2010\fs24\cf1  }
{\plain\b\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 The \'d2Commons\'d3}
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\ql{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Locke supposed that the world had been \'d2given to men in common\'d3 by God. \'d4Belongs to mankind in common\'d5 isn\'d5t exactly pellucid, to be sure, but on the face of it, it says that the world is literally a }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 commons}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 . And many seem to have taken that claim as axiomatic\'d0\'d0as though a \'d2state of nature\'d3 must, as such, be a commons. It is nothing of the sort. \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 To see this, we must distinguish two senses of \'d4commons\'d5. One sense designates a stretch of territory over which no rights are defined. Obviously natural things prior to ownership are common in that sense. But it supplies no support for the Lockean idea. T}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 he other idea, however, is indeed relevant. In this sense, a commons is a specialized case of }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 joint ownership, each owner having specific rights to the use of the commons property, with many correlated exclusions. No member of the commons-using group may privatize any of it. All members get to graze, or whatever, at will\'d0\'d0within the limits prescrib}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ed by the commons owners collectively. If all of nature is such a system, all persons being members of the commons corporation, then, as Locke saw,}
{\plain\up5\f2010\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up5\f21\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn }
{\plain\f21\fs20\cf1    }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 Locke, Section 28: \'d2If such a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him.\'d3 In the Everyman edition (New York: Dutton, 1966), it\'d5s on p. 130).}
}}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  we would have to ask }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 everybody}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  for permission to use }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 anything}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 . \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Real commons systems are incapable of being universal in that way. Participants in real commons systems deny others access to their \'d2means of production.\'d3 The claim that the world is such a commons is not just dubious but utterly arbitrary, and the inferen}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ce intended, that all have an equal claim to access, is incoherent. Commons, like other forms of ownership and use, provide certain benefits for members and exclude others. }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 Everyone\'d5s}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  having a share is simply impossible.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Locke himself invokes a theological story that many appear to find congenial. They shouldn\'d5t. In the first place, no one can have any reason for thinking that the creator, if there is one, would necessarily \'d2give\'d3 nature to mankind in general, rather than }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 some favored group\'d0\'d0the \'d2Chosen people,\'d3 say\'d0\'d0or even to no one. In any case, we must reject theology for these purposes. Theology is not publicly provable from common sense and science; to use it at all discriminates against those with different religious}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  views, or none. To base laws for all on the religion of some, or even on the denial of religion, flouts the Law of Nature.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Once we understand that the world was not made by anybody, for anyone or any purpose in particular, then we must confront the fact that the world is just stuff, devoid of moral qualities and not owned by anyone, let alone by everyone. It is therefore wrong}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  to suppose that the \'d2state of nature\'d3 situation is one in which individual B has as his bargaining chip the status of \'d2Commons,\'d3 so that he is in a position to say to A: \'d2Here, you get to keep x provided that the rest of us are reckoned to be the exclusiv}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 e members of the Commons Corporation, and we\'d5ve decided that you have to pay such-and-such a rent.\'d3 But }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 t}
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 hat}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  isn\'d5t the situation facing people. What we do face is, simply, each other, with our various interests and powers.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 This moves us to a more fundamental level of moral theory. The State of Nature is not naturally equipped with any rules whatever, about anything. The question is whether we can improve on that state of affairs by accepting some set of rules, and if so, whi}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ch ones. That is what moral and political philosophy is about. Now, that situation is necessarily one in which each person asks what his best bargain is, given the situations of himself and others. The Hobbesian thesis about this is that the cause of the p}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 roblems in this state is our possession and retention of the liberty to use all means whatever, including force, to achieve our ends. The Hobbesian solution is for all of us to give up the right to use force, as asserted in his First Law of Nature: \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj\li360\ri360{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 That every man, ought to endeavor Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre.}
{\plain\up4\f2010\fs9\cf1 \up4 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up5\f22\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1  }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 Leviathan}
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 , Ch. XIV. }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 (New York: E. P. Dutton, Everyman  Library, 1950), p. 107.}
}}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1  \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 We do not follow Hobbes in his further proposal that we require a political Sovereign. Hobbes held that the sovereign would have complete say in these matters: \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj\li360\ri360{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 Seventhly, is annexed to the Sovereign, the whole power of prescribing the Rules, whereby every man may know, what Goods he may enjoy and what Actions he may do, without being molested by any of his fellow Subjects: And this is it men call }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 Property}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 .}
{\plain\up4\f2010\fs9\cf1 \up4 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up5\f21\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn }
{\plain\f21\fs20\cf1   }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 Leviathan}
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 , Ch. XVIII (New York: E. P. Dutton, Everyman  Library, 1950), p. 149.}
}}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1  \par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 This \'d2solution\'d3 has it that whatever the government says is right }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 is}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  right. How could anyone believe that? But in any case, it obviously can\'d5t tell us which rules the Sovereign }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 ought}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  to propose. Invoking Sovereignty here is useless.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 To that question\'d0\'d0which rules are good rules?\'d0\'d0there is only one credible answer: those which provide each person\'d5s best option, given rational compliance by all. That is the classic question of the Social Contract. Hobbes\'d5s Laws of Nature suggest the answ}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 er that what each receives in return for surrendering his liberty to use force is, simply, the like surrender of all others, yielding a social world in which each may do and get whatever he can }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 by peaceable means}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 , that is, without molesting others. Hobbes\'d5s Second Law of Nature has it \'d2That a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth, as for Peace, and defense of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.\'d3}
{\plain\up5\f2010\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up5\f21\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn }
{\plain\f21\fs20\cf1   }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 Leviathan}
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 , Ch. XIV. (New York: E. P. Dutton, Everyman  Library, 1950), pp. 107-8.}
}}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1  }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Hobbes is right: that is the }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 best}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  bargain we can make at so general a level. But accepting a right to use force against nonharmful persons for certain purposes\'d0\'d0even that of having enough to eat\'d0\'d0is not a good bargain. \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Why not? This is a large issue, but, briefly, the trouble is that it is much too good for the unproductive who are its beneficiaries, and much too bad for the productive, on whom it imposes the duty to support the rest. For without the efforts of productiv}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 e people, the very food that the unproductive are begging for wouldn\'d5t exist. It is not rational, then, for all to grant them a claim in justice to it. Real indigents, assuming them otherwise innocent, must either offer their services in return for sustena}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 nce, or appeal to the sentiments of the productive. Doing so, fortunately, will provide them with outcomes greatly superior to those proffered by well-meaning proponents of commons rights. \par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\ql{\plain\b\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 Finders (First Users), Keepers\par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 What can we say about property, then, if peace and liberty is to be our guide? The answer is that we should accept the right of first users\'d0\'d0\'d2finders, keepers\'d3\'d0\'d0a principle recognized by the classic writers on these matters, such as Pufendorf, Hobbes, and }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Kant, as well as Locke. More precisely, the principle is that of }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 first use}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 . She who gets there first }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 and}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  commences to use it, in ways that require ongoing access to it, may use it so long as she wants. No one else may use it without her say-so, until such point as she either sells or gives it to somebody, dies without leaving a will, or ceases to care. A mor}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 e abstract contemporary formulation is David Gauthier\'d5s \'d2Lockean Proviso\'d3 which \'d2prohibits bettering one\'d5s situation through interaction that worsens the situation of another.\'d3}
{\plain\up5\f2010\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up5\f22\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn }
{\plain\f22\fs20\cf1  }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1  David Gauthier, }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 Morals by Agreement}
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 205. See also Mack, }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 Op. Cit}
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 . note 2.}
}}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  What constitutes \'d2one\'d5s situation,\'d3 to be sure, is what is largely at issue. The essence of the proposal is that one\'d5s situation consists of oneself and those elements of the environment over which one has exerted and continues intentionally to exert cont}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 rol. It does not include the indefinite array of opportunities that one has as yet done nothing to realize.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Of course it will not always be easy to decide just what a given user is using and how his use extends into the future. But it is obviously wrong to appeal simply to the first user\'d5s desires or intentions, by themselves; his intended further activities reg}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 arding x must be quite realistically focused }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 on x}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  and not, for example, on the entirety of North America. Use is }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 use}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \'d0\'d0not pie-in-the-sky. Others coming on the scene must be able to have publicly ascertainable evidence of the first-user\'d5s presence and activities. But that is typically available. Further clarification will often be needed, requiring discussion and negotia}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 tion. Nevertheless, those negotiations proceed from a baseline that is not arbitrary. Human activities of using this or that are identifiable, to a large extent, prior to determinations by judges or onlookers. Our proposal makes these prior initial activit}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ies the baseline from which such discussions must proceed.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Why this rule and not some other? For example, why not \'d2second come, first serve,\'d3 or \'d2all comers, no matter when, get equal control\'d3? The answer is that second-comers }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 intervene}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  in first-comer\'d5s uses, and thus violate the general liberty principle. They prevent continuation of a commenced activity, one which harmed no one when initiated, and in which the initiator invests effort, on the results of which he forms expectations and }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 plans. If you lock me in my room, thus preventing me from bicycling to the next town if I should want to do so, you interfere with my liberty. Your actually muscling me off my bicycle, bundling me into the room and locking it interferes still more. In gene}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ral, stopping people from doing what they are doing is our paradigm of interference. Telling them (authoritatively, with one\'d5s authority backed by force) that they can\'d5t do what they are realistically planning to do comes next. But telling them that they c}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 an\'d5t do what they would never have dreamed of doing anyway, and have done nothing to initiate, counts for nothing. I do not deprive you of the moon by pointing out that nothing you do is likely to get it for you, nor of the land down the road that you migh}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 t like to have, yet never knew of.  \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Any}
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1  }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 other rule than the rule of first use conflicts with the liberty principle. If it gives the use to some designated other persons, it is no longer }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 general}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 , for it makes some people subordinate to others, arbitrarily preferring those others. If we give that use, as such, to B whom we claim to be \'d2more productive,\'d3 then we arbitrarily suppress A\'d5s activity, by deciding what counts as productive and how much i}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 s enough. The injunction not to take things because you must instead share them with others is, as we saw, absurd. The rule of first use uniquely respects the liberty principle. \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Rights for first-users ensure optimal use from the social point of view. If Jones must wait to use x until the Central Committee decides it\'d5s O.K., the resource lies unused meanwhile. And when the Committee does decide, it will arbitrarily block some in fa}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 vor of others, contrary to Liberalism. But if Jones need only clear it with those on whom his labor impinges, he\'d5s in a position to get a lot more done. In the rare case where he\'d5s in unoccupied land, this implies that he need seek no one\'d5s approval\'d0\'d0in di}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ametric contrast to the Commons view, which in principle, as Locke saw, requires that he clear it with }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 everyone}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 . The difference in administrative cost is astronomical.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  \par }
\pard\qc{\plain\b\f2010\fs24\cf1 5. The Status Quo\par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 This clears the way for our remaining interpretation. According to it, the only legitimate restriction on our activities is that we not interfere with what others }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 already have}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 . The fact that in doing so appropriators deprive the others of the opportunity to do with x any of the things that are incompatible with initial users\'d5 uses of x is irrelevant. There are innumerable mutually incompatible uses of anything. Someone\'d5s realiz}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ing one of them rather than any of the indefinitely many others that consequently go unrealized cannot, just as such, count as an interference with anyone\'d5s liberty. That would be like saying that I interfere with you by virtue of your not being me. \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 In the abstract, the relation among us in regard to our sheer desires for particular objects and activities looks to be zero-sum. If it were, that would put an end to social philosophy, for it is logically impossible to have a social rule, valid for all an}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 d willed by all, declaring that in zero-sum games, party A should win. However, once time enters the picture, the appearance of zero-sum ceases. Given time, someone can get there first. His use competes with no others at that time. Yet from then on, until }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 he yields it up, anyone else\'d5s attempting to use it requires a disruption of the first-comer\'d5s actions. \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 The first-use rule leaves \'d2enough and as good\'d3 for others only in the sense that one leaves them in uncoerced possession of }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 what they have}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  and whatever they go on to acquire without trampling on the previous possessions of others. If, in their view, they do not have \'d2enough\'d3 in the way of specific useful possessions, then they, like everyone else, have their work cut out for them: find or ma}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ke some more, being subject, in the process, only to the restriction that they not damage what others have\'d0\'d0may not, that is, interfere with what those others are already doing. If all their efforts fail, they are thrown upon the mercy of others. Another p}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 opular Lockean idea says that one\'d5s neighbor should have a \'d2sufficiency,\'d3 which the better-off should if necessary help them to achieve. But the unproductive are not }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 owed}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  anything as compensation for the sheer fact that they didn\'d5t get to x first. That fact would be strictly uncompensable anyway, were there any reason to think it a ground for compensation. But there isn\'d5t. For in taking something from the \'d2state of nature,}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \'d3 we are not taking anything from anyone, since it belongs to no one. There are no valid claims to compensation. \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 We should realize, though, that what is really enough and as good is liberty\'d0\'d0noninvasion. We are adequately compensated for loss of the liberty to use force\'d0\'d0which is a real loss, not a fanciful one\'d0\'d0by others\'d5 surrender of the same liberty, thus yielding}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  a social world in which peaceful exchanges and transfers are possible. That is the sole and sufficient basis of private property in things outside our own bodies. Such property can, of course, be jointly owned by many (voluntary) participants, as in genui}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ne commons arrangements,}
{\plain\up5\f2010\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up5\f20\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn }
{\plain\f20\fs20\cf1   }
{\plain\f20\fs24\cf1  For this reason, Randy Barnett has coined the term \'d4several property\'d5 to designate the notion. See his }
{\plain\f20\fs24\cf1 The Structure of Liberty}
{\plain\f20\fs24\cf1  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 64-5.}
}}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  but anything else will interfere with activities legitimately undertaken. \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Now, consider what those who allege that we also need compensation for something we have supposedly lost by someone\'d5s appropriation of some natural object are asserting. What they lose is opportunities. And it is indeed possible for people in some cases to}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  have a claim to compensation for loss of opportunity. If A deprives B of some important resource, such as pianist B\'d5s fingers, then A certainly owes B a great deal in the way of compensation. But this is not because he has appropriated something affording}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  opportunities that the other person has thereby lost in the absence of any specific antecedent claim to those opportunities. It is because the other person already }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 has}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  a special claim on those items. B\'d5s claim to those particular fingers is that they are parts of the very body that constitutes B. He had use of them in the status quo ante and now has not; A, then, has deprived B of something he previously had. But that i}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 s never true in regard to things one has done nothing to commence use of, however much one would }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 like}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  to have them. Morals, and the state, cannot be in the business of giving people what they want just because they want it. For that can only be done at the expense of others who produce or discover the things in question. And they may have no reason to dev}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ote them to such purposes.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 In special cases, there are equal claims to something, as when A and B arrive at x simultaneously. In such cases, they must resolve their claims by negotiation. They might try a partnership, or one buy out the other. The price is a function of opportunity }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 costs, indeed; but it is the equality of claims grounded in antecedent activities that matters. In state-of-nature appropriation, of course, this will be rare: Jones and Smith might work from opposite ends of the same mineral vein, meeting, to their surpri}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 se, in the middle. But to talk as though such cases are the norm, as though we are all \'d2there first,\'d3 is unintelligible. There is no way to make the appropriate measurements to restore the satisfaction that persons not in on particular appropriations there}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 by lose. To repeat: you cannot restore what someone never had in the first place.\par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qc{\plain\b\f2010\fs24\cf1 Circularity?\par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 It is common to think that the legitimizing of private ownership through first-use is somehow question-begging. Grunebaum, for instance, objects to Nozick\'d5s theory of original appropriation in respect of \'d4previously unowned\'d5 items, complaining that if \'d4pre}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 viously unowned\'d5 means that nobody has previously become the owner }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 within}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  a system of private ownership, then \'d2the argument already presupposes private ownership as the form of ownership in which the appropriation takes place and thus is obviously question begging.\'d3}
{\plain\up5\f2010\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up5\f21\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1  James Grunebaum, }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 Private Ownership}
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1  (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987) p. 81.}
}}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1   As it would indeed, if the argument did presuppose that. But it doesn\'d5t. \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 In the first place, the }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 explication}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  of the theory doesn\'d5t presuppose anything. It specifies certain acts\'d0\'d0people grasping things, walking on surfaces, and so on\'d0\'d0that are describable without reference to any system of ownership. A can grasp x whether or not A owns x or ever heard of ownersh}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ip. The theory then proposes\'d0\'d0not }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 pre}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 supposes\'d0\'d0that those who perform those acts, in the conditions the theory specifies as sufficient, are to be taken as thereby entitled to use the thing in question in the future. Of course the theorist owes us an explanation }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 why}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  we should accept that theory rather than some other.}
{\plain\up5\f2010\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up5\f21\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1  See Grunebaum, Op. Cit., pp. 57-63.}
}}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1   But it is not one of the reasons why we shouldn\'d5t accept it that it somehow \'d2presupposes\'d3 itself.  \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Nozick got us worrying about the Proviso by distinguishing two interpretations of Locke: \'d2First, by losing the opportunity to improve his situation by a particular appropriation or any one; and second, by no longer being able to use freely (without appropr}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 iation) what he previously could.\'d3}
{\plain\up5\f2010\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up5\f21\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1  Nozick, 1974, p. 176 }
}}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1   The first is wrong because any given opportunity may be taken by only one or  some few persons, and whoever gets it thereby excludes others; no principle }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 can}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  protect a general right to opportunity. What about the second and, as he claimed, weaker option? \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Nozick says, \'d2With the weaker requirement, . . . though person Z [the first person for whom there is not \'d2enough and as good\'d3 left to appropriate] can no longer }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 appropriate}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 , there may remain some for him to }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 use}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  as before.\'d3}
{\plain\up5\f2010\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up5\f21\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn }
{\plain\f21\fs20\cf1   }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 Ibid}
}}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  Does this help? No. For ownership simply }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 is}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  the right to use. If B has not appropriated x, or been given x by some previous owner, then x }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 isn\'d5t}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  B\'d5s to use as he will,}
{\plain\up5\f2010\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up5\f21\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1  In this system, \'d2Only those who are laboring upon or using the land may claim title to it for the period of their use.\'d3 Nobody would be allowed to actually }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 own}
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1  anything -- that\'d5s how you or I would describe it, upon learning that this supposed ownership system didn\'d5t actually give anybody the right to buy or sell anything!}
}}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  and that status isn\'d5t available to B as a bargaining chip against A who wants to appropriate x to B\'d5s exclusion. What B already has, he of course has the right to continue to use; but what he doesn\'d5t have, and has been taken by others, he has no claim on,}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  nor did he ever. To repeat: given liberalism, we do not primordially own the world\'d1only ourselves. And even that isn\'d5t primordial. We must argue even for that. But Hobbes, I believe, has provided such an argument. In the absence of the general right not t}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 o be molested by others for their own purposes, life for ourselves is bound to be worse. But we get that general right only from others, by mutual recognition.\par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qc{\plain\b\f2010\fs24\cf1 Circularity of the Commons Hypothesis}
{\plain\f2010\fs24\cf1 \par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Reflection shows that all views of the types I have found wanting, apparently including both of those distinguished by Nozick, make a mistake of the same fundamental kind. For in claiming that the appropriation of pieces of the world for the exclusive use }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 of the appropriator restricts the liberty of others, they subtly assume that we have a prior }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 positive}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  right to use all those things. Such a right requires others to see to it that the rightholder gets it, if he is not able to do so on his own. Before ever coming near the place\'d1indeed, before even being born, so these theories say\'d1we all had some kind of c}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 laim or hold on the world, such that others proposing to go forth and use bits of it must make sure that we get some too, if we happen to want some; and therefore those others are required to justify their appropriations by arranging, in advance as it were}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 , that we are adequately \'d2compensated\'d3 for being no longer able to acquire them ourselves. But compensated for what? Not for what we have done, since we haven\'d5t done anything, by hypothesis; nor for damage to our products, since there are no such products.}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  We are, it seems, to be \'d2compensated\'d3 merely for }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 existing}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \'d1and at others\'d5 expense. But there is no such thing as a claim on the world, as such: worlds know naught of claims. Claims are against some (or all) other }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 person}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 (s). The only intelligible meaning to be assigned to notions of claims on things is that they are claims against other people }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 about}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  those things. To have a claim on, say, an \'d2equal share\'d3 of Nature is to have a claim against other people regarding how it is to be used, or who uses it. But what would be its basis? \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Our examination has shown us the options. If it\'d5s the claim that we must be allowed to use whatever we can that is still waiting to be used, then that is equivalent to claim (5), which I  defend here. But it gives us no positive antecedent claim on bits of}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  nature. Rather, the general right of liberty, which we negotiate in the pre-ownership \'d2state of nature,\'d3 says that we are  free to use hitherto unused things, provided we not molest anyone else\'d5s efforts to use other things.   \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 The contrary view needs to explain why it should be thought that we somehow already own the place, and thus get to charge for anybody else\'d5s use of it, despite having done nothing to come by it. No support has been provided for that claim, and as a suppose}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 d complaint against the liberty principle, it is beside the point. Critics of private property often point with special derision to those who got wealth by inheritance, the criticism being that they didn\'d5t do anything to deserve it.}
{\plain\up5\f2010\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up5\f21\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn }
{\plain\f21\fs20\cf1   }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 See Jan Narveson, \'d2Deserving Profits,\'d3 in Robin Cowan and Mario Rizzo, eds, }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 Morality and Profits}
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995)}
}}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1   Yet that is precisely the complaint against a priori claims to social ownership. The difference is that in the cases these critics have in mind, such as inheritance from wealthy parents, those parents }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 did}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  do something to acquire that wealth, or got it from others who did; and having done so, what they wanted to do with it next, as it turns out, was to give it to the inheritors. What is ours is what we may do as we wish with, and giving it to someone else i}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 s one of those things; thus general liberty gives us the right to do it. But no such intelligible explanation is forthcoming in common-ownership theories. Having jettisoned theological stories, for the reasons given, the question how we all came to be part}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 -owners of the place, and thus to have a general obligation to \'d2distribute\'d3 the material world to other claimants, becomes unanswerable. The \'d2commons\'d3 theory is not really rival theory to ours: it has, rather, }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 no}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  theory, unless we count sheer assertion as theory.\par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qc{\plain\b\f2010\fs24\cf1 The Prospects of Others\par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\b\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 It is one of the important paradoxes of moral theory that sometimes restrictions on our behavior, even quite harsh ones, nevertheless conduce to our good. The point certainly applies resoundingly to the present subject. The right to acquire without fear of}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  expropriation by others, even needy others, enables a society to increase its wealth to the point where there will be few if any needy, and make what few needy there are quite easy to cater to. Writers from Aristotle through Locke, Adam Smith to Hayek, Da}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 vid Schmidtz and others have made the case. The \'d2secret\'d3 of wealth is no secret at all: it lies in intelligent hard work plus respect for other people\'d5s productive activities. That respect consists in a general and reliable disposition to refrain from forc}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ibly depriving others of the results of their work. The more general and reliable such respect is, the greater the wealth of the society in question.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Reflecting on the spirit of Locke\'d5s Proviso, the rightness of the interpretation supported in this chapter is due, at bottom, to a fact that is inadequately appreciated by social thinkers: wealth comes from human effort, not nature\'d5s.}
{\plain\up5\f2010\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up5\f21\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn }
{\plain\f21\fs20\cf1   }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 The point is delightfully as well as cogently made in P. J. O\'d5Rourke\'d5s book, }
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1 Eat the Rich}
{\plain\f22\fs24\cf1  (Atlantic Monthly Press, 1998).}
}}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1   Locke noted that a small area of well-cared-for land in the England of his day had a thousand times the value of a similar area in the \'d2wilds of America.\'d3 He was thinking mainly of its capacity to yield food for humans, with then-current agricultural tec}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 hnology. Today we look to the conditions for the production of high-definition TVs, fast-preparable Thai dinners, air-conditioned off-road vehicles, Lyrca running suits, performances of }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs20\cf1 The Ring of the Nibelungs}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 , aspirin, and thousands of other useful products and services, none of which existed in a state of nature. The land on which stand the factories, retail stores, and opera houses for producing and distributing these things has several million times the val}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ue of similar-sized areas of sheer wilderness. Virtually all of this fabulous collection of goods was unheard of by people of earlier times, and none comes from unaltered nature, except the wilderness preserves whose aesthetic and recreational value rests }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 on their  unavailability for the production of other goods. \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 These points lead to a fundamental reflection. The value of anything lies in what we can do with it, and that is a function of our and other people\'d5s cognitive efforts relating to it. How would one ensure that there is \'d2enough and as good left for others\'d3 }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 when one formulates a new scientific theory or a plan for an improved microchip? The very question seems absurd. Ideas use no material resources, thus ensuring no reduction of such resources \'d2left for others.\'d3 The creative work of Newton, Beethoven, or Ste}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ve Jobs does not subtract from a pre-existing mass of something provided by nature. If we broaden our sights from symphonies to better mousetraps and superior grades of winter wheat, then what people do along such lines is essential to all wealth, not just}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  intellectual and spiritual wealth. We have what we have, material or otherwise, because a great number of people have applied their ingenuity to specific problems relevant to the satisfaction of human interests, ranging from hunger to sheer curiosity. The}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  idea that wealth consists in the accumulation of a large mass of natural stuff is utterly wrong. It is astonishing that that model should still be dominating discussions of this subject.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 What makes particular bits of wealth available to other people is trade. Above all, there is the exchange of labor for goods or for other services between those who can provide the one and make use of the other, to the benefit of both. Only the Lockean Pro}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 viso in our last form can maximize benefits from such interactions. Exchanges of capital are really reconfigurations of productive capability, whose profitability is a function of their catering to voluntarily acting consumers at the end of the line. Consu}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 mers, in turn, can afford to buy because they are also producers, able to exchange their work with others who see potential benefit from it. \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 The result of all this is the general and, given peace and decent health, continual improvement in the well-being of all participants. Improvement is not necessarily for nonparticipants; providing for them is a matter of sympathy, love, or general human co}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ncern, rather than justice. The condition on which anything can be done for the unproductive is the previous activity of the productive\'d0\'d0usually the same persons earlier in life. Locke\'d5s Proviso has nothing to do with the unproductive: his concern that the}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 re be enough and as good in the way of usable natural resources for others applies only to those who can produce. And rightly so. In society production comes first. }
{\plain\b\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 There has been quite a ferment of concern among recent writers, including philosophers, that the supposedly high consumption patterns of people in modern industrial countries will exhaust the earth\'d5s resources: \'d2sustainable development\'d3 is asserted to be a}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  serious problem for us now and in the future. Previously, this was a concern that human population would \'d2outstrip its food supply,\'d3 a claim completely falsified by now. Per capita consumption of food has increased along with human population around the w}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 orld\'d0\'d0not decreased, as the Malthusian view had it.}
{\plain\up5\f2010\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up6\f20\fs12\cf1 \up6 \chftn }
{\plain\f20\fs24\cf1  For the figures and original sources, see Ronald Bailey, editor, }
{\plain\f20\fs24\cf1 The True State of the Planet}
{\plain\f20\fs24\cf1  (New York: Free Press, 1995), specifically the articles by Nicholas Eberstadt (pp. 7-48) and Dennis Avery (pp. 49-82). }
}}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1   But the source of the Malthusian error has been resolutely ignored, it would seem, by most contemporary writers. The error is the same: failure to see that wealth consists in what we make of nature, not in nature itself. The desire to do better impels in}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 genious people to find better and better ways to use what is on hand. We recycle, reuse, and devise ways to make use of materials that exist in inexhaustible supply instead of ones that become scarce, or require trivial amounts of natural resources in the }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 first place. Cumulative human knowledge solves problem after problem; less and less yields more and more; and issues of natural resource exhaustion fade into irrelevance.}
{\plain\up5\f2010\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up5\f20\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn }
{\plain\f20\fs20\cf1   }
{\plain\f20\fs24\cf1 The modern apostle in these matters is the late Julian Simon, to whom we are all in much debt. His last major work is }
{\plain\f20\fs24\cf1 The Ultimate Resource II}
{\plain\f20\fs24\cf1  (Princeton University press, 1996), where the thesis is lavishly supported with facts and figures.}
}}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1   \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Thus the original intent of Locke\'d5s proviso is met, in spades, by the on-going process of human production stimulated by individuals\'d5 interests, protected by property rights.  What is \'d2left\'d3 for others is, overwhelmingly, the opportunity to avail themselve}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 s of the production of their fellows. As society becomes more complex in its differentiation of products and skills, we are increasingly dependent on propensities to exchange on the part of their fellows, who meanwhile become reliable producers and exchang}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ers. Thus what\'d5s left for others is not merely \'d2as good,\'d3 but much better from the start, and as time goes on incomparably better, to the point where the opportunity to appropriate bits of land suitable for agriculture or mining, say, equipped with primiti}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ve know-how, is looked on with contempt by all. Much better to leave the farming to others equipped with state-of-the-art agricultural technology. In the United States today, far more people are employed serving food in restaurants than on the farms that p}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 roduce the food in the first place; waiters and waitresses, cooks and cashiers\'d0\'d0all are better off than they could ever have been on any primitive farm.}
{\plain\up5\f2010\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up5\f20\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn }
{\plain\f20\fs20\cf1   }
{\plain\f20\fs24\cf1 For an extremely instructive and admirably clear explication of the role of property rights for meeting any reasonable requirements intended by the Lockean proviso, see David Schmidtz, \'d2The Lockean Proviso,\'d3 and the two subsequent sections in his }
{\plain\f20\fs24\cf1 The Limits of Government}
{\plain\f20\fs24\cf1  (Boulder, Col: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 17-26. }
}}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1   \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 The most important kind of property we can have is, broadly speaking, intellectual rather than material, including knowledge of processes, formulas, and the like, as well as academic and literary writings. Here our thesis amounts to the view that one is en}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 titled to something like copyright on one\'d5s ideas, so long as they are original. It is absurd to think of intellectual workers as drawing upon a quantifiable set of preexisting resources, with a possibility of not leaving \'d2enough and as good for others.\'d3 I}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 deas are as good as the thinker makes them, and the only interpretation of Locke\'d5s Proviso that makes sense in their case is that proposed in this chapter. Prohibition on plagiarism, entitling creators to the free use of their own ideas, suffices. There is}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1  ample room for controversy here: who thought of it first, and what exactly \'d2it\'d3 is, are analogous to problems of identifying the limits of acquired material resources, entailing the same need for means of negotiating disputes on these matters. It is also }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 obvious that virtually all intellectual work is heavily dependent on the work of predecessors\'d0\'d0this chapter being an example. Rewards for such productions should be, and usually are, bestowed on individuals with a lively sense of obligation to their predec}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 essors. Still, the point is that there isn\'d5t any sense to the idea that there is a great stock of preformed ideas lying about, such that one could unfairly help oneself to too many of them, leaving insufficient for others. Beethoven is a hard act to follow}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 , but plenty of composers have managed, and in any case, there is no way to declare the field unfairly exhausted by Beethoven, who thus cheated the rest by walking away with the best ideas for himself. \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Really, the models provided by the composer and the novelist, along with those of the technologist, the scientist, and the tinkerer, are more appropriate for understanding human wealth than those provided by hunting deer and coconuts. The entrepreneur has }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ideas about how to do things better, enabling more people to derive more benefit from the same fundamental range of natural resources. There is no limit to the supply of good ideas, hence no purchase for the distribution-limiting interpretations of the Loc}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 kean Proviso regarding them. And since they are the real source of wealth, there is also no rational application of distribution-limiting interpretations, even in their original area of application\'d0\'d0natural resources.  \par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qc{\plain\b\f2010\fs24\cf1 Conclusions and Restrictions\par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Once we reject the adventitious theological components of Locke\'d5s theorizing about natural resources, we are left with no reason to think that later-comers are owed compensation for first-comers\'d5 acquisition of natural resources. But there is strong suppor}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 t, only sketchily asserted here, for the liberty principle as a premise for our inquiry. The most natural understanding of that principle implies a general right of acquisition of previously unowned resources of the general sort Locke asserted: the right t}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 o use bits of nature for our purposes, as we will, \'d2without asking the consent of anyone,\'d3 provided only that we respect the like liberty of others. \tab \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Readers will rightly want to hear about problems thought to be rampant in the contemporary world, and alleged to stem from the institution of private property. The view advocated here does nothing to support the idea of an enforceable obligation to maintai}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 n  a \'d2safety net\'d3 of involuntarily supported social services. And there would be much else to discuss in regard to resources and their supposed scarcity, especially in respect of pollution and the like. All of these questions can, I think, be satisfactoril}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 y responded to, but not in a discussion of this size.}
{\plain\up5\f2010\fs10\cf1 \up5 \chftn {\footnote\pard\ql\fi360{\plain\up4\f20\fs9\cf1 \up4 \chftn }
{\plain\f20\fs20\cf1   }
{\plain\f20\fs24\cf1 See other relevant essays in Bailey, }
{\plain\f20\fs24\cf1 Op. Cit}
{\plain\f20\fs24\cf1 ., previous note, for a quite comprehensive picture.}
}}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1   My argument has been concerned wholly with what has been regarded throughout the three or so centuries since Locke\'d5s work as a major problem for liberal theory. That problem is easily solved when we see that the Lockean Proviso as Locke framed it is a mi}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 stake. As a restriction on initial acquisition of the type it is all but universally regarded as being, it is baseless and must be jettisoned. But in the only form in which it is sustainable, our fifth option, it has no redistributive implications, requiri}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ng only that people not acquire by force or fraud. \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 Does the the property/liberty formula apply everywhere and always? In every society, there will be property: valued ornaments and differentiated useful implements have been private in every society. And all such tribes are anxious to claim hunting grounds }
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 or planted areas as tribal domains excluding all external competitors. But wherever the outputs of differing individuals is highly variable as a function of skill and knowledge, their products readily exchanged, and distinctive consumer profiles exist, ind}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 ividually private property comes to the fore. That efforts to countermand the institution in developed societies lead to poverty at best is the lesson of the twentieth century large-scale experiments in communism, all of them dismal failures.  \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 That property rights exclude, as it turns out, is their prime virtue. The exclusion involved is ultimately beneficial for the excluded, but in the first instance the basis for it is straightforward: first use underwrites ownership, with no restrictions oth}
{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 er than the obligation to respect the similar right of others, because that protects the free exercise of human effort. The right to do that is really just the right to be us. \par }
\pard\ql\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs20\cf1 \par }
\pard\qc\fi480{\plain\b\f2010\fs24\cf1 \par }
\pard\qc{\plain\b\f2010\fs24\cf1 Notes}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 \par }
\pard\qc\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 This chapter}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1  is published i}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 n }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 Public Affairs Quarterly}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1  13, no. 3 (July 1999), 205-27, and is reprinted with kind permission of its editors. }
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 Early versions go back to 1991, since which I have benefited from discussion at presentations to many audiences, notably at the Canadian Philosophical Association meetings in Calgary, Alberta, 1994. My thanks also to David Schmidtz, John T. (Jack) Sanders,}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1  and many others, including the editor of that journal, John Kekes, for helpful discussion.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 1.  Robert Nozick, }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 Anarchy, State, and Utopia}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1  (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 174-82. \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 2.  I am particularly unhappy to have to omit the extensive discussion deserved by Eric Mack\'d5s \'d2The Self-Ownership Proviso: A New and Improved Lockean Proviso,\'d3 \-}
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 Social Philosophy and Policy}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1  12, no. 1 (Winter 1995), 186-218. In Mack\'d5s view, \'d2the recognition that each person owes others as self-owners includes abstention from the disablement of their world-interactive faculties, talents, and energies\'d3 (201). We can disable these by making that}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1  world virtually unavailable to them as an object of interaction. My main excuse for not discussing Mack\'d5s important paper is lack of space; my secondary excuse is that I do not believe his thesis has a real-world divergence from my own, however much it wo}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 uld affect things in worlds very different from our own. But his paper richly deserves a careful reading by those pursing this topic. He and I also have benefited from papers by John T. Sanders, such as \'d2Justice and the Initial Acquisition of Private Prope}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 rty,\'d3 }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1  10 (1987),  367-400.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 3.  Locke, }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 Second Treatise on Civil Government}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 , ch. 2, sect. 6. In P. Laslett, ed., }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 Two Treatises of Government}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1  (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 271.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 4.  Locke, section 27; in Laslett, }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 Two Treatises}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 , }
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 287-88.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 5.  }
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 Nozick, }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1  Anarchy, St}
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 ate}
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 , and Utopia,}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1   178.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 6. See, for example, Matt Ridley, }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 The Origins of Virtue}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1  (New York: Viking Penguin, 1997),  230-33.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 7.  To argue that specific preferences are}
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1  non}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 innocent precisely }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 because}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1  not all could fulfill them is question-begging. It is also  absurd, as the rest of the chapter will show.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 8. See Allan Gibbard, \'d2Natural Property Rights,\'d3 }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 Nous}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 , 1976,  77-86; reprinted in Robert M. Stewart, ed., }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 Readings in Social and Political Philosophy }
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).  \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 9. Locke, section 28: \'d2If such a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him.\'d3 Laslett}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 , }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 Two Treatises}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 , 288.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 10. Thomas Hobbes, }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 Leviathan}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1  (New York: E. P. Dutton, Everyman  Library, 1950), 107.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 11.  Hobbes}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 , }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 Leviathan}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 ,  149.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 12.  Hobbes}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 , }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 Leviathan}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 ,  107-8.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 13. David Gauthier, }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 Morals by Agreement}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 205. See also Mack, }
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 \'d2The Self-Ownership Proviso.\'d3}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 14. For this reason, Randy Barnett has coined the term \'d4several property\'d5 to designate the notion. See his }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 The Structure of Liberty}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 64-65.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 15. James Grunebaum, }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 Private Ownership}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1  (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987),  81.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 16.  Grunebaum, }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 Private Ownership}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 , 57-63.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 17.  Nozick,}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1  }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 Anarchy, State, and Utopia}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 , 176.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 18.  Nozick}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 , }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 Anarchy, State, and Utopia}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 , 176. \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 19.  In this system, \'d2Only those who are laboring upon or using the land may claim title to it for the period of their use.\'d3 Nobody would be allowed to }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 own}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1  anything\'d0\'d0that\'d5s how you or I would describe it, upon learning that this supposed ownership system didn\'d5t actually give anybody the right to buy or sell anything!\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 20.  }
{\plain\f21\fs18\cf1  }
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 See chapter 9. \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 21.  The point is delightfully as well as cogently made in P. J. O\'d5Rourke\'d5s book, }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 Eat the Rich}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1  (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1998).\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 22.  For the figures and original sources, see Ronald Bailey, ed., }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 The True State of the Planet }
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 (New York: Free Press, 1995), specifically the chapters by Nicholas Eberstadt (7-48) and Dennis Avery (49-82). \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 23.  The modern apostle in these matters is the late Julian Simon, to whom we are all in much debt. His last major work is }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 The Ultimate Resource II}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1  (}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 Princeton, N.J.: }
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 Princeton University Press, 1996), where the thesis is lavishly supported with facts and figures.\par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 24. For an extremely instructive and admirably clear explication of the role of property rights for meeting any reasonable requirements intended by the Lockean Proviso, see David Schmidtz, \'d2The Lockean Proviso,\'d3 and the two subsequent sections in his }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 The Limits of Government}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1  (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1991), 17-26. \par }
\pard\qj\fi480{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 25. See other relevant essays in Bailey, }
{\plain\i\f2010\fs18\cf1 The True State of the Planet}
{\plain\f2010\fs18\cf1 , for a quite comprehensive picture. And see chapter 16.\par }
}