Ph.D. - Economics, Queen's University (2008)
Masters - Economics, Financial Specialization, Queen's University
(2003)
Bachelors - Economics and Computer Science, University of Western
Ontario (2002)
Using the case of credit risk insurance in banking, we explore
the consequences of counterparty risk on the contracting parties.
Click here
and here
to view the not for publication appendices which include an additional
extension of the model and the key results without the limited
liability
assumption on the insurer.
Winner of the Toronto CFA Society Fellowship Award.
Winner of the Northern Finance Association Best Student Paper
Award.
When a bank can chose between dispersing risk by credit derivatives or
direct sales, what influences their choice when both are affected by
asymmetric information?
An Efficient Market for Information, (with Douglas
Gale and Frank
Milne), Draft: September 2008.
Information dissemination while preserving the welfare theorms with
the example of the market for managers and salary evolution.
Liquidity Attacks and The Role of Central Banking, (with Frank Milne),
June 2008 .
We model the concept of a liquidity attack and explore how central
bank intervention can mitigate or exacerbate the problem.
Asymmetric Information and Debt Market Freezes, January 2009.
We explore the mechanism by which asymmetric information can
induce optimal delay of borrowing or lending.
