

Barnes, B. (1995). "Metaphorical Painting: Michelangelo, Dante, and the Last Judgment." The Art Bulletin **77**(1): 65-81.

The sixteenth-century writer Giovanni Andrea Gilio said that Michelangelo's manner of painting used "metaphor and metonymy." The interpretation presented in this paper suggests Michelangelo wanted the viewer to complete references in a manner that can be compared to the understanding of metaphor and other figures of speech. A reference to the Paradiso in the upper zone of the painting establishes Michelangelo's identity with the poet, while the references to Dante below can be read as suggesting the entire Inferno and as a veiled criticism of vice within the hierarchy of the Church.

Biernacki, R. (2000). "Language and the Shift from Signs to Practices in Cultural Inquiry." History and Theory **39**(3): 289-310.

A Model of culture as a partially coherent system of signs comprised the most widely employed instrument for analyzing cultural meaning among the new cultural historians. However, the model failed to account for meanings that agents produce by executing social practices rather than by only "reading" contrasts among signs. It also encouraged some analysts to conceive the difference between sign system and concrete practice as that between what is graspable as an intellectual form and what remains inaccessibly material or corporeal. This essay introduces three exemplars of the ties between signs and practices to show how the pragmatics of using signs comprises a structure and a generator of meaning in its own right. In the three exemplars, which are based on the tropes of metonymy, metaphor, and irony, I employ the analytic tools of linguistics to appreciate the non-discursive organization of practice. Analysis of the diverse logics for organizing practice offers promising means for investigating how signs come to seem experientially real for their users. Finally, this view of culture in practice suggests new hypotheses about the possible interdependencies as well as the lack of connection among the elements of a cultural setting.

Curtis, J. M. (2002). "Metaphor Is to Dostoevskii as Metonymy Is to Tolstoi." Slavic Review **61**(1): 109-127.

The terms metaphor and metonymy, as defined by Roman Jakobson, produce important insights when applied to the novels of Fedor Dostoevskii and Lev Tolstoi. The oeuvre of each novelist constitutes a remarkably consistent whole because it emanates from the creative unconscious, rather than from conscious thought processes. In Jakobson's view, metaphor involves the "combination of heterogeneous elements"; such elements in Dostoevskii include contrasting styles, genres, and references to other art forms such as painting. Windows juxtapose interior and exterior space, as the reading of letters juxtaposes private to public communication. By contrast, metonymy involves the linking of similar elements. As a metonymical writer, Tolstoi tended to take the opposition between self and other that he inherited from the romantic tradition and transform it into a relationship between self and self. The purpose of his well-known device of estrangement is to create just such transformations. In

courtship, the self-other relationship is that of man to woman; Tolstoi minimizes this relationship by avoiding all sincere expressions of desire that lead to marriage.

Dubnick, R. (1980). "Visible Poetry: Metaphor and Metonymy in the Paintings of Rene Magritte." Contemporary Literature **21**(3): 407-419.

Hart, P. R. (1997). "Metaphor, Metonymy and Myth in The Petty Demon." The Slavic and East European Journal **41**(3): 431-441.

Hoey, A. (1988). "The Name on the Coin: Metaphor, Metonymy, and Money." Diacritics **18**(2): 26-37.

Lakoff, G. and M. Johnson (1980). Metaphors we Live by. Chicago: , University of Chicago Press.

THE CLASSIC TEXT, highly instrumental in sparking cognitive linguistics, cognitive poetics/rhetoric, and the multidisciplinary interest in metaphors and other tropes. Here is a review by Peter Norvig, UC Berkeley (<http://norvig.com/mwlb.html>):

Wayne Booth [Booth] has written that, judging from the recent jump in interest in metaphor, if we extrapolate to the year 2039, there will be more students of metaphor than people. Linguists, philosophers, and psychologists have been quick to jump on the metaphorical bandwagon, but so far AI researchers have not. Lakoff and Johnson's ``Metaphors We Live By" (henceforth ``MWLB") is an important contribution to the study of metaphor that presents a number of controversial points. Investigating these points provides a good backdrop for presenting the state-of-the-art of metaphor in AI work.

First of all, ``Metaphors We Live By" is an accessible and thought-provoking source of examples demonstrating the range of metaphor in everyday language and thought. This is not a technical book; it is aimed at a general audience. There is very little terminology, nary a greek letter, and no lists of `starred' ungrammatical sentences. Instead, the arguments are stated simply, and are illustrated by examples which are usually phrases one has heard, or at least could imagine someone actually saying.

The examples show that metaphor is not just a rhetorical device of poets. It is metaphor to speak of arguments in terms of battles, as in ``I demolished his argument" or ``his claims are indefensible." It is metaphor to use spatial prepositions to describe non-spatial relationships, as with ``Harry is in love" or ``Harry is in the Elks" or ``Harry is in trouble." It is metaphor to personify, as when we say ``Cancer finally caught up with him."

After demonstrating the pervasiveness of metaphor, the second contribution of Lakoff and Johnson is in showing a small number of highly productive metaphor

schemata that underly much of language understanding. As an example, one particularly pervasive and productive metaphor is Michael Reddy's conduit metaphor, which underlies the understanding of communication. The conduit metaphor has three constituent metaphors: IDEAS ARE OBJECTS, LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS, and COMMUNICATING IS SENDING. The metaphor is expressed in phrases like "it's hard to get that idea across," "it's difficult to put my ideas into words," or "his words carry little meaning." Another example of a systematic metaphor schema is MORE IS UP, which leads to expressions like "the deficit is soaring" or "his income fell." Such schemata are motivated, but not predicted. It is easy to see why MORE IS UP is a better metaphor than MORE IS DOWN, but one still has to learn which of the many reasonable metaphors are actually used within a culture. Once the metaphor schema is learned, it is easy to generate new instances of it. Lakoff and Johnson present about fifty basic metaphor schemata, with many examples of each.

To Lakoff and Johnson, metaphors are not just matters of language, but are used extensively in reasoning and understanding. Typically, an abstract domain is understood metaphorically in terms of a more concrete domain. To a large degree, they argue, the human conceptual system is metaphorical. This is very different from the classical model of metaphor, which claims that metaphors are artifacts of language use, and have nothing to do with meaning or understanding. It is also very different from most AI models of knowledge representation and language understanding.

The classical theory of metaphor also says that metaphors arise from objective similarity. Thus, we can speak of 'digesting an idea' because the mental action of attending to the expression of an idea, reasoning about it, and coming to understand it is objectively similar to the physical action of ingesting food, breaking it into nutrients, and absorbing them into the system. Lakoff and Johnson argue against the idea of a priori objective similarity. They claim metaphors do not just point out similarities that are objectively true; they create the similarities. The notion of digesting an idea is coherent only within the context of other metaphors, such as IDEAS ARE OBJECTS and THE MIND IS A CONTAINER. These basic metaphors both create similarities of their own and allow for the creation of further similarities in the IDEAS ARE FOOD metaphor. The second half of MWLB is not really about metaphors at all; it is a comparison of the traditional objectivist theory of semantics with a new view they call the experientialist theory of meaning.

AI Models of Metaphors

While little has actually been done with metaphor in existing AI systems, it has been recognized as a problem. Wilks [Wilks] calls metaphor "central to our language capabilities," Hobbs [Hobbs] states "metaphor is pervasive in everyday discourse," Carbonell [Carbonell] agrees that metaphors "pervade commonly

spoken English," and Rumelhart [Rumelhart] says ``metaphor is natural and widespread in our speech."

There is some existing AI work on metaphor which could be greatly improved by an understanding of MWLB. For example, Winston's [Winston] Transfer Frame system is primarily intended as a model of analogical reasoning, but Winston has used it to try to understand metaphors. The system interprets sentences such as ``Robbie is like a fox" to mean `Robbie is clever.' It does this by adhering to the strict objectivist position that foxes really are clever (and have almost no other characteristics). There is no provision for metaphors that create similarities, only an algorithm for finding pre-defined similarities, which consists solely of counting the common features and relations. ones. A casual glance at the range of examples in MWLB shows that Winston's approach could never be extended to cover the full range of metaphorical usage.

A more interesting approach is that taken by Hobbs and by Rumelhart. They both argue that metaphor interpretation is not only basic to language understanding, it should be indistinguishable from literal language interpretation. This challenges the traditional view of semantics, in which meaning is derived by a simple composition of the meanings of the individual lexemes in the sentence. This literal meaning may differ from the conveyed meaning according to certain rules, such as Gricean maxims. Metaphor interpretation is treated as a secondary process that follows literal interpretation, in this view. Hobbs notes that an expression can pass from a novel metaphor to a frozen idiom to a tired cliché, but at each stage the interpretation process is much the same. Thus, he argues there is no sense having separate mechanisms for `literal' and `metaphorical' interpretations. Rumelhart considers the interpretation of sentences like ``The policeman raised his hand and stopped the car." This uses no metaphors, but it requires a complex interpretation process that must identify knowledge structures having to do with traffic cops, drivers, brakes, and cars. This interpretation goes well beyond a simple composition of the literal meanings present in the words, and is similar to the type of interpretation that is done in processing metaphors.

Jaime Carbonell has been the most accepting of Lakoff and Johnson's ideas of anyone in AI. He has been the only one to suggest that the existence of a small number of powerful metaphors means that a good strategy for a language understander would be to try to classify inputs as instances of one metaphor or another, rather than trying to interpret them on general principles. Carbonell presents the start of a process model for language comprehension [Carbonell], but unfortunately he retreats from Rumelhart and Hobbs' position and calls for a two-step process that does literal interpretation first, and metaphorical interpretation only if that fails. Carbonell's suggestion has not yet been implemented.

It is an open question whether the experientialist model of semantics is a good one for AI work. On the one hand, the model is grounded in bodily experiences. The

metaphor schema HAPPY IS UP, according to Lakoff & Johnson, is motivated by the fact that people have more erect postures when happy. Other metaphors are based on similar perceptions, none of which can be handled directly with current AI technology. On the other hand, the model stresses a knowledge-rich approach, where much of the burden of understanding is handled by known metaphor schemata. This 'strong method' approach seems more in line with current AI research, and more promising than the 'weak method' of metaphor understanding based on general principles of similarity.

A weakness of MWLB in terms of AI is that they have no developed process model of understanding, and no theory that relates metaphor comprehension to other comprehension tasks. The AI researcher who is looking for a theory he can immediately implement will be disappointed. The book is useful for its examples and for its questions about the nature of truth and reality, but not for a complete set of answers to these questions. For example, MWLB will tell you that, given AN ARGUMENT IS A CONTAINER and that a container has a deepest part, one can conclude that an argument has a deepest part. We are not told why, given that AN ARGUMENT IS A CONTAINER, a container is a physical object, and a physical object has a color, it is not the case that an argument has a color.

Another problem with MWLB stems from one of its strengths: its non-technical approach makes it widely accessible, but also means that much detail is left out. For those who are skeptical of the approach, the remaining detail may be unconvincing. Similarly, those who are excited by the approach will wish for more references, an index, more formal arguments, and more detailed explication of fine points.

Lakoff, G. and M. Turner (1989). More than Cool Reason: A Field guide to Poetic Metaphor. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

Promotional blurbs from the publishers website:

"The authors restore metaphor to our lives by showing us that it's never gone away. We've merely been taught to talk as if it had: as though weather maps were more 'real' than the breath of autumn; as though, for that matter, Reason was really 'cool.' What we're saying whenever we say is a theme this book illumines for anyone attentive." — Hugh Kenner, Johns Hopkins University

"In this bold and powerful book, Lakoff and Turner continue their use of metaphor to show how our minds get hold of the world. They have achieved nothing less than a postmodern Understanding Poetry, a new way of reading and teaching that makes poetry again important." — Norman Holland, University of Florida

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More on Traditional Views

Lichtenberk, F. (1991). "Semantic Change and Heterosemy in Grammaticalization." Language **67**(3): 475-509.

In Oceanic languages, elements that function or used to function as directional verbs of motion-'go', 'come', and 'return'-undergo a variety of grammaticalization processes. This study is an investigation of the semantic aspects of those developments, the factors that motivate the functional extensions, and the relations among the meanings/functions of the etyma. It is human conceptualization of phenomena (viz. metaphor and metonymy) that directly motivates the developments. Even though the various meanings/functions of an etymon are all historically related, synchronically there need not be any property exclusively shared by all of them. The nature of the motivations for the functional extensions provides support for the view of meaning as essentially subjective and open-ended.

Nolan, M. B. and F. W. Maitland (2003). "Metaphoric History: Narrative and New Science in the Work of F. W. Maitland." PMLA **118**(3): 557-572.

This article reads the work of F. W. Maitland, a foundational figure in medieval legal scholarship, as an extended meditation on the theory and practice of writing history. Because Maitland's scholarship not only occupies a central place in two disciplines (law and history) but also negotiates the competing demands of an older, narrative form of historiography and the newer, scientific discourses of sociology and anthropology, his writing illustrates the persistence of certain epistemological and methodological questions. In particular, it reveals a deep interest in the modes through which history is figured. Recognizing that history is epistemologically constructed through and by tropes-metaphor, metonymy, analogy-each with its own conceptual and practical logic, Maitland turns to a notion of metaphoric history to productively sustain the tension between the abstract and the concrete, the whole and the part, that haunts nineteenth-century history writing.

Oakley, T. and S. Coulson (2008). Connecting the Dots: Mental Spaces and Metaphoric Language in Discourse. Mental Spaces in Discourse and Interaction. T. Oakley and A. Hougaard. Amsterdam, John Benjamins Publishing Company.

The cognitive theory of mental spaces and conceptual integration (MSCI) is a twenty-year-old, cross-disciplinary enterprise that presently unfolds in academic circles on many levels of reflection and research. One important area of inquiry where MSCI can be of immediate use is in the pragmatics of written and spoken discourse and interaction. At the same time, empirical insights from the fields of interaction and discourse provide a necessary fundament for the development of the cognitive theories of discourse. This collection of seven chapters and three commentaries aims at evaluating and developing MSCI as a theory of

meaning construction in discourse and interaction. MSCI will benefit greatly not only from empirical support but also from clearer refinement of its methodology and philosophical foundations. This volume presents the latest work on discourse and interaction from a mental spaces perspective, surely to be of interest to a broad range of researchers in discourse analysis.

Ohnuki-Tierney, E. (1990). "Monkey as Metaphor? Transformations of a Polytropic Symbol in Japanese Culture." *Man* **25**(1): 89-107.

Most symbols are polytropic as well as polysemic in that their multiple meanings in various contexts functions as different types of trope. This article pursues the complex nature of polytropes through a formulation of synecdoche as an interstitial trope between metaphor and metonymy, and demonstrates how the two conceptual principles of analogy and contiguity, that define metaphor and metonymy respectively, are interdependent and interpenetrated, rather than of basically different natures as presented in the biaxial image of structural linguistics. The analogic thought expressed in metaphor involves movement and temporality, just as does the discursive thought of metonymy. The interpenetration of the two modes of thought is demonstrated through an analysis of the process of objectification of what, throughout history, has been a dominant symbol of self in Japanese culture: the monkey. As a polysemic and polytropic symbol, the monkey takes on different meanings, and functions as different tropic types, sequentially or simultaneously, as actors use and/or interpret the symbol in varying historical and social contexts.

Peterfreund, S. (1994). "Scientific Models in Optics: From Metaphor to Metonymy and Back." *Journal of the History of Ideas* **55**(1): 59-73.

Presmeg, N. C. (1992). "Prototypes, Metaphors, Metonymies and Imaginative Rationality in High School Mathematics." *Educational Studies in Mathematics* **23**(6): 595-610.

The growing recognition that imagination, far from being a peripheral adjunct plays a central role in reasoning has important implications for the teaching and learning of mathematics. This paper has two main parts. In the first part, examples from high school case studies are used to illustrate prototypical mathematical images and the use of imagery in metaphoric and metonymic ways in mathematics. In the second part, pattern imagery and other types of imagery are discussed as central components in a model of mathematical reasoning. It is suggested that different forms of imagery may be used in ways that make abstraction and generalization possible in mathematics. The more abstract forms are idiosyncratically constructed by individuals. However, it is suggested that the activity of the imagination in the model presented here is central to meaning-making, and that the process makes shared meanings possible. Some social consequences for mathematics classrooms are explored briefly.

Purcell, W. M. (1987). "Transsumptio: A Rhetorical Doctrine of the Thirteenth Century." Rhetorica 5(4): 369-410.

Previous editions, translations, and analyses of the thirteenth century artes poetriae have ignored or obscured the significance of transsumptio, equating it to metaphor. A closer analysis of the treatises reveals that transsumptio is the organizing principle through which metaphor, synecdoche, metonymy, antonomasia, allegory, and catachresis are encoded and decoded. A transsumptio represents the middle term in a syllogistic operation wherein dissimilar phenomena are related. This study demonstrates that thirteenth century rhetorical theory offers a more insightful account of tropical language than has previously been offered. Additionally, the study demonstrates that Humanist attempts to reestablish classical rhetorical doctrines served to diminish understanding of transsumptio and its relevance to rhetoric.

Reed, T. P. (2000). "Mary, the Maiden, and Metonymy in "Pearl"." South Atlantic Review 65(2): 134-162.

On the most basic level, symbols surrounding the Holy Virgin attempt to name the unnameable. Mary becomes paradoxical in such attempts: metaphorically she is, for example, at once bride of her son, mother of her father, and sister and mother to all of humanity (cf. Brown, 16: 1-12).' Similarly, the inexpressibility topos in Pearl paradoxically expresses and foregrounds the gap between time- and space-bound human language and the total otherness of divinity. The poem's recapitulative formal qualities, embodying the central spherical metaphor of the poem, the eponymous jewel, heighten this feeling of difference between mundane things and the perfection of divine things, even as the poem speaks of bridging this gap. The poem uses the pearl image and many other metaphorical figures, comparing the ineffable to worldly things, in order to represent this otherness.

Rice, D. (1980). "Catastrop(h)es: The Morphogenesis of Metaphor, Metonymy, Synecdoche and Irony." SubStance 9(1): 3-18.

Sadler, J. D. (1980). "Metaphor and Metonymy." The Classical Journal 76(2): 157-160.

An excellent bunch of examples from classical literature.

The first paragraph:

The two figures of speech metaphor and metonymy are rather closely linked together.

Metonymy is the use of one word for another, and metaphor is the use of a word in a transferred sense. The metaphorical word will normally be used in place of one which carries the meaning regularly. Both these figures abound in literature and may be thought of only in that connection, but they also figure prominently in language under the heading of semantic change.

Sanders, M. (2001). "Poetic Agency: Metonymy and Metaphor in Chartist Poetry 1838-1852." Victorian Poetry 39(2): 111-136.

Reflecting on the first National Convention, the original historian of Chartism, R. C. Gammage, commented wryly, "It did not turn out to be a perfectly harmonious body." According to Gammage, the major source of discord was the disagreement between the advocates of "moral" and "physical force" (pp.

106-111). While subsequent Chartist historiography has offered a more nuanced account of the range of opinion within Chartism, it has also confirmed Gamage's assessment that the related questions of strategy and agency bedevilled the Chartist movement throughout its existence. The intention of this article is to demonstrate the extent to which Chartist poetics participate in this central problematic--that of identifying and representing a social force capable of securing the Charter.

Broadly speaking, the article will argue that Chartist poetry represents agency through one of two poetic strategies. The first uses metonymy and metaphor to invoke and evoke agency respectively, whilst the second identifies specific concrete groups which it seeks to interpellate as the agents of change. It will argue that these changes in poetic strategy are symptomatic of changes in political understanding. The displacement of metonymy by metaphors of natural force, and the increasingly self-conscious and sophisticated use of these metaphors combined with the emergence of a strategy of interpellation is, it will be argued, the poetic analogue of the progressive, albeit uneven, development of Chartist political analysis. (--First two paragraphs of article.)

Sandor, A. (1986). "Metaphor and Belief." Journal of Anthropological Research **42**(2): 101-122.

Given statements can be metaphoric or literal according to a person's beliefs. Statements mean what they mean in terms of some world. One person's or culture's metaphor may be another person's or culture's metonymy, or indeed another person's or culture's literal truth. Anthropologists often try, as do people in general, to make metaphoric sense of statements which seem to make no sense literally. It may be more useful in such cases, however, to try to construe a world which allows a literal reading. The view that language is fundamentally metaphoric, and that truth can only be expressed metaphorically, is a recent one and is based on a certain view of the world. Seeing metaphors everywhere means assimilating other worlds to a particular world: it is ethnocentric and works against understanding strange worlds. Tribal societies are not 'poetic'; their creativity consists in producing a world different from other (tribal) worlds, not in transfiguring an objectively given reality.

Schofer, P. (1974). "Dissolution into Darkness: Bresson's 'Un Condamné à mort s'est échappé'." SubStance **3**(9): 59-66.

Rhetoric, like many architectural ruins, remains a vestige of Pagan antiquity. Gerard Genette (Figures III) has encapsulated its dismemberment and diminution through the centuries: inventio, dispositio and elocutio are reduced to one category, elocutio, the "ornaments of discourse", which in turn become two isolated monuments to the past: figures and tropes. Finally, figures disappear and tropes are compressed into a sole term, metaphor, by the beginning of the twentieth century. But the vestige has recently metamorphosed into avatar, as metonymy, synechdoche, antithesis, and ellipses are retrieved from

nineteenth century manuals of rhetoric and redefined, re-formed. (First paragraph of the article.)

Smith, J. M. (1996). "Geographical Rhetoric: Modes and Tropes of Appeal." Annals of the Association of American Geographers **86**(1): 1-20.

Geographers are frequently enjoined to identify and satisfy the interests of their audience, as performance of this service is the ultimate justification for the field's continued existence. There is, however, little agreement on how best to render this service, largely because there has been little thought about the nature of the audience, or about its role in shaping geographical discourse. Geographers must recognize the existence of multiple audiences, and understand that these audiences are not identical to existing institutional and epistemological categories. Audiences are constituted by rhetorical prejudices and preferences. To satisfy an audience, and earn its trust, the writer must confirm their prejudices and respect their preferences. I present two alternative maps of geographical audiences, using selected examples from twentieth-century Anglophone geography. First, I describe prejudices about the nature of action, which a writer must confirm if he or she is to be regarded as "good," and consequently re-map geographical discourse in terms of Northrop Frye's fictional modes (romance, tragedy, comedy, and irony). Second, I describe preferences for types of representation, which a writer must respect if he or she is to be regarded as "speaking well," and consequently re-map geographical discourse in terms of Kenneth Burke's master tropes (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony). I conclude that geographical rhetoric is primarily shaped by the need to win the trust of an audience. The rhetorical cultivation of trust does not preclude the pursuit of truth as a goal of geographical writing, but it must be regarded as primary.

Sokoloff, N. B. (1984). "Metaphor and Metonymy in Agnon's "A Guest for the Night"." AJS Review (Association of Jewish Studies Review) **9**(1): 97-111.

Roman Jakobson's now classic distinction between metaphor and metonymy defines two primary modes of linguistic thought: on the one hand relations of similarity and dissimilarity, and on the other relations of contiguity or, we might say, dependence and independence. Though they find their most condensed expression in the tropes metaphor and metonymy, these same principles govern phonemic, lexical, and phraseological levels of language, and they operate as well in larger segments of discourse. A piece of fiction or poetry, for example, may develop along lines of association by likeness or through links of sequence and consequence. (First paragraph of the article.)

Sokoloff, N. B. (1986). "The Discourse of Contradiction: Metaphor, Metonymy and "El reino de este mundo"." Modern Language Studies **16**(2): 39-53.

As critics have quite rightly noted, Alejo Carpentier's *El reino de este mundo* relies more heavily on apposition than on succession as a principle of narrative organization.' The text recounts a series of social upheavals in Haiti from approximately 1764 to 1821, but it does not present history fundamentally in

terms of sequence and consequence. Though events essentially follow a chronological trajectory, gaps in time, abrupt changes of perspective and a minimum of transitional narrative here lead to a juxtaposition of many disparate incidents, giving a first impression of chaotic disjunction. Emerging then from this disorder comes a schema of parallel actions and motifs that imposes cohesive design on the episodic events. The Blacks who instigate revolution against tyrannical, decadent White rulers soon discover that their own leader, Henri Christophe, displays the same shortcomings as his predecessors. He, too, fails to resist the corrupting influence of power and neglects to appreciate popular beliefs and aspirations. The text implies that the Agrimensores, who later assume political control, will likewise fail in a position of leadership. A wealth of symmetries becomes apparent, indicating that comparable patterns of hope and despair accompany each shift of power. In this way the text allows the reader to understand the multiple incidents as various manifestations of a single phenomenon, and so we come to see history as a cyclical re-enactment of essentially unchanging human dilemmas

Spector, S. J. (1984). "Monsters of Metonymy: Hard Times and Knowing the Working Class." ELH 51(2): 365-384.

Dickens bestows hardly a single spark of his vitalizing genius upon Stephen Blackpool and Rachael, Hard Times's thwarted working-class lovers. Like Victor Frankenstein's creation, a monstrous assemblage with limbs and features ironically chosen for their beauty, Stephen and Rachael are automatons compounded of such Victorian middle-class virtues as industry, honesty, selfdenial, chastity, and deference. Where Frankenstein's unattractive child entertains, Dickens' beau ideal of the industrial worker bores. Silhouetted against a vivid environment, the new industrial landscape of Coketown, the textile workers' lifelessness stands out in bold relief. Coketown continues to serve as a model of the grimy factory town and as a demonstration of the power of Dickens' realism, which, as his contemporaries were fond of repeating, rivalled the photograph. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that as early as 1856 the incommensurability of the stereotyped industrial workers to their finely drawn environment should have been noticed. In the Westminster Review George Eliot, in one sentence, brought forth the classic indictment of Dickens: "We have one great novelist who is gifted with the utmost power of rendering the external traits of our town population; and if he could give us their psychological character-their conception of life, and their emotions-with the same truth as their idiom and manners, his books would be the greatest contributions." (First paragraph of article.)

Steen, G. (2005). "Metonymy goes Cognitive-Linguistic." Style 39(1): 1-11.

To provide a context for the essays published here, this introduction to the special issue on metonymy highlights a number of aspects of the

cognitive-linguistic discussion of metonymy of the past twenty-five years. It briefly sketches the development of metonymy studies in poetics, linguistics, and philosophy, emphasizing that the cognitive-linguistic approach to metonymy of the past decades represents a return to the semantic views of metonymy advocated in structuralist semantics. This development was triggered by the extensive study of metaphor, but metonymy has now emancipated itself as an autonomous field of study that displays complex and unresolved relations with metaphor. This introduction also attends to the new insights added by cognitive linguistics to such a semantic approach to metonymy, suggesting that metonymy has indeed gone cognitive linguistic.

Stewart, J. F. (1995). "Metaphor and Metonymy, Color and Space, in Lawrence's *Sea and Sardinia*." *Twentieth Century Literature* 41(2): 208-223.

D. H. Lawrence's use of metaphors in "Sea and Sardinia" is examined. The metonymic mode modulates into the metaphoric as comparison and substitution are brought into play. (Abstract)

Structurally, the coordinate title *Sea and Sardinia* suggests metonymy and synecdoche. As Lawrence remarks at the outset of a later book of travel sketches: "One says Mexico: one means, after all, one little town. . . . All it amounts to is one little individual looking at a bit of sky and trees, then looking down at the page of his exercise book" (Mornings 3). But through selection and combination, one moment can stand for many and one place for a country or ethos.

What Lawrence called "Spirit of Place" is born of a momentary interaction between the writer's perspective powers, shaped by his experience, and external geography. In this encounter the strange and the familiar throw each other into relief; the traveler looks inward as well as outward and compares the scene before him with remembered scenes. The stimulus of unfamiliar landscapes can activate the deepest desires, dreams, and values (cf. Tracy 2-3). Mark Schorer affirms, "There is probably no other writer in literary history whose works responded so immediately to his geographical environment as Lawrence, and certainly there is no other modern writer to whose imagination 'place' made such a direct and intense appeal" (282). (First two paragraphs of article.)

Turner, H. S. (1992). "Metaphor and Metonymy in Galdós and Tolstoy." *Hispania* 75(4): 884-896.

Turner, M. (1991). *Reading Minds : The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science*. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.

The great adventure of modern cognitive science, the discovery of the human mind, will fundamentally revise our concept of what it means to be human. Drawing together the classical conception of the language arts, the Renaissance sense of scientific discovery, and the modern study of the mind, Mark Turner offers a vision of the central role that language and the arts of language can play in that adventure.

Reviews:

"Works such as [this] form the vanguard of our understanding; from the research front, they signal the presence of new and more fruitful relationships between the sciences and rhetorical and literary studies."--Alan G. Gross, College English

"The author demonstrates how a new revolution in critical thought demands an understanding of how humans think; this is more than knowing about neurons and synapses, however. A thoughtful book for those of us tired of trying to find the humanity in postmodern criticism."--The Bloomsbury Review

"A philosophically sophisticated work that goes a long way toward an empirically responsible account of the bodily and imaginative bases of concepts, meaning, reasoning, and language."--Mark L. Johnson, Review of *Metaphysics*

(From the publisher's website.)

Turner, M. (1997). *The Literary Mind: The Origins of Thought and Language*. New York, Oxford University Press.

We usually consider literary thinking to be peripheral and dispensable, an activity for specialists: poets, prophets, lunatics, and babysitters. Certainly we do not think it is the basis of the mind. We think of stories and parables from Aesop's Fables or *The Thousand and One Nights*, for example, as exotic tales set in strange lands, with spectacular images, talking animals, and fantastic plots - wonderful entertainments, often insightful, but well removed from logic and science, and entirely foreign to the world of everyday thought. But Mark Turner argues that this common wisdom is wrong. The literary mind - the mind of stories and parables - is not peripheral but basic to thought. Story is the central principle of our experience and knowledge. Parable - the projection of story to give meaning to new encounters - is the indispensable tool of everyday reason. Literary thought makes everyday thought possible. This book makes the revolutionary claim that the basic issue for cognitive science is the nature of literary thinking.

In *The Literary Mind*, Turner ranges from the tools of modern linguistics, to the recent work of neuroscientists such as Antonio Damasio and Gerald Edelman, to literary masterpieces by Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, and Proust, as he explains how story and projection - and their powerful combination in parable - are fundamental to everyday thought. In simple and traditional English, he reveals how we use parable to understand space and time, to grasp what it means to be located in space and time, and to conceive of ourselves, other selves, other lives, and other viewpoints. He explains the role of parable in reasoning, in categorizing, and in solving problems. He develops a powerful model of conceptual construction and, in a far-reaching final chapter, extends it to a new conception of the origin of language that contradicts proposals by such

thinkers as Noam Chomsky and Steven Pinker. Turner argues that story, projection, and parable precede grammar, that language follows from these mental capacities as a consequence. Language, he concludes, is the child of the literary mind.

Offering major revisions to our understanding of thought, conceptual activity, and the origin and nature of language, *The Literary Mind* presents a unified theory of central problems in cognitive science, linguistics, neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy. It gives new and unexpected answers to classic questions about knowledge, creativity, understanding, reason, and invention.

(The jacket blurb.)

Vickers, B. (1988). "The Atrophy of Modern Rhetoric, Vico to De Man." *Rhetorica* 6(1): 21-56.

This essay surveys the progressive atrophy of rhetoric in modern times, in particular the reduction of the tropes (which amounted to some thirty or so in the classical handbooks). Giambattista Vico claimed that only four tropes were essential (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony). Roman Jakobson reduced the whole of rhetoric, and most of literature, to the dichotomy of metaphor versus metonymy. Paul de Man variously picked out one trope as constitutive of whole literary genres, and then posited an endless self-destructive fission between rhetoric as trope and rhetoric as persuasion. I argue that these influential fragmentations of rhetoric involve massive distortions, and endanger its future.

Whitson, S. (1989). "'Sanitized for Your Protection": On the Hygiene of Metaphors." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 19(3): 253-262.

The metaphor has gained much importance as of late. No longer simply a decorative feature of discourse, the trope has obtained an epistemological and ontological dimension. No longer merely a figural flourish of prose, the metaphor has acquired an important role in the study of human understanding. Hence, thanks to theoretical rehabilitation and philosophical reconsideration, metaphorical analysis has become an important and popular pursuit for many disciplines--philosophy, literary theory, linguistics, rhetoric, et al. While the insights generated and the discoveries made by metaphorical analysis are significant and worthy of much study, we will take as our point of departure the limits of such critical inquiry. This essay offers another perspective, a sort of theoretical intervention which examines from another angle the study of discourse. Rhetorical theory, it will be reasoned, benefits from a perspective which considers the metonymical features of discourse. As such, the comparative advantages of either metaphorical or metonymical analysis are not measured by which one is true, but rather by which one is most useful for a given project. Simply put, a metonymical perspective can recognize and explain a terrain outside the scope of metaphorical analysis. The change we consider in this essay does not render useless or inadequate previous explanations, but

rather opens a space or a zone from which to critically evaluate what has been previously overlooked. (First two paragraphs of the article.)